#895 Plausible Arguments for an Absurd Conclusion

Dr. craig’s response

You’re right, Austin, that Dennett’s response to the theistic arguments is the same as my (opening) response to the argument for fatalism. The difference is that Dennett had no reason to think that theism is absurd or unintelligible (or at least gave none), whereas I do explain why fatalism is unintelligible.

Rejecting seemingly plausible arguments for an obviously false conclusion is common in philosophy. Two examples that come readily to mind are Zeno’s arguments against the possibility of motion and McTaggart’s argument against the reality of time. The reality of motion and time is so evident that any argument that they are unreal has got to be flawed, even though Zeno’s arguments resisted solution for centuries and McTaggart’s paradox continues to puzzle philosophers.

By contrast there is nothing evidently absurd or unintelligible about theism. True, during the latter third of the 20^th century, some philosophers argued against the coherence of theism. But the net result of the debates that were sparked was a strengthening of theism, as the coherence of various divine attributes was defended by theistic philosophers and the anti-theistic attack defeated. Dennett gave no reason at all for his conviction that theism is evidently false.

By contrast, as I explained, fatalism (which holds that everything that happens happens necessarily) is unintelligible because it posits a constraint on libertarian free actions (and other causally indeterminate events) that makes no sense. Events which are utterly causally indeterminate are said to be somehow constrained to happen—but by what? Fate? What is that but a mere word? No one has been able to make sense of this alleged constraint.

So in the case of fatalism, we have good reason to think that the position is false, whereas in the case of theism we do not.

So in response to your specific questions:

1. If a given position strikes us intuitively as "obviously" absurd, false, unintelligible or metaphysically impossible, are we justified in holding our intuitions even if the position in question is based on very plausible and convincing premises?

Sometimes, yes, if the falsity of the position is more obvious than the truth of the premisses. In such a case you should reject one of the premisses. In this case, are not we begging the question against the "obviously" absurd proposition?  Not at all! You can explain why the position in question is obviously false, as I have done regarding fatalism. The non-theist will similarly have to explain why atheism is more obviously true than the premisses of a given theistic argument.

2) Given that what is absurd seems to be "person-relative" and great philosophical minds have defended such supposedly absurd positions, is [it] not more reasonable to follow the premises wherever they lead even if they lead to a conclusion which seems absurd to us?

If you’re almost alone in finding the position absurd or unintelligible, then it should give you pause that most other people do not agree with you. But in cases like fatalism, Zeno’s paradoxes, and McTaggart’s paradox, almost everybody does find the position in question to be obviously false. By contrast few philosophers these days find theism, when appropriately articulated, to be obviously false. That can help to inspire confidence in our judgement. I shouldn’t be too worried about a few philosophers’ defending the unintelligible position. Cicero once remarked that no position is so absurd that it has not been defended by some philosopher.

3) Are there any epistemological criteria or standards to decide objectively when we have to reject the apparently plausible premises for an "absurd" conclusion, or when to accept the conclusion despite its apparent absurdity because the supporting premises are very good?

I haven’t really thought about this much, but off the top of my head it seems to me that you should accept an argument for an apparently absurd conclusion only if all the premisses of that argument are more plausibly true than the conclusion. If the conclusion is more obviously false than the premisses, then you may reject the argument. To avoid arbitrariness, you should be able to articulate some reason for thinking that the conclusion is more obviously false than the premisses.