#889 Evil Worlds and the Ontological Argument
May 26, 2024Hi Doctor Craig,
I am a great admirer of yours. And I really hope this question receives a response from you... It is one of my dreams to be able to receive your insights directly one day. I am a Christian high-schooler in Canada, your works have helped me tremendously in staying faithful to the LORD given the obstacles and difficulties the secular school system throws at me on a constant basis.
In your lecture: "Excursus on Natural Theology Part 25: Q&A on the Ontological Argument", you were being asked if a maximumly great being's existence is really metaphysically necessary given that there are possible worlds in which all there is are sufferings and evil. The following was your response (starting from 25:56 of the video):
"You can draw two conclusions from this. You could say, 'A-ha! I guess that shows that there are logically possible worlds in which God does not exist,' which is what you suggested, in which case God is not maximally great. Or you could say (and this is what I would say) such worlds are not in fact really possible. They are actually impossible because they are inconsistent with the existence of God, as you quite rightly point out.".
But I don’t think your response to the objection is really viable, for it begs the question rather obviously. The third premise of the Ontological Argument states "if a maximumly great being exists in one possible world, then it exists in all possible worlds". And when the atheist objects to this point by saying there are possible worlds in which the maximumly great being could not exist, you say that those possible worlds aren't *really* possible because they are "inconsistent with the existence of God"... That's basically saying God must exist in every possible world because there are no possible world in which He does not exist. Considering the ultimate goal of the Ontological Argument is to prove that God exists, this sort of response is very circular. But I sincerely wants to know, if you think your response to the objection is indeed circular. If yes, how do you then respond to the objection to the Ontological Argument from the “existence” of possible worlds that are inconsistent with God’s nature, without begging the question? Hope you could answer this question for me and resolve any confusion I may have. Thank you again for your works.
Sincerely,
Jacky
Canada
Dr. craig’s response
A
I don’t think my answer is circular, Jacky. Look at it again. All I do is lay out the two conclusions that one may draw from the objection. Those are our options: Either a maximally great being does not exist or the envisioned worlds are not really possible. Though I express which conclusion I believe, I don’t say why. So there’s no question-begging or circularity going on.
If you were to ask me why I prefer the option I do, I would revert to the first premiss of the ontological argument, that it’s possible that a maximally great being exists. If that premiss is true, then it follows that the envisioned world of utterly gratuitous and unredeemed suffering is not really possible, since it is incompatible with God’s moral perfection. The charge of begging the question can then be lodged with equal justice against the atheist who assumes that such a world is possible.
So the question is, do we have better reasons to think that the first premise of the ontological argument is true rather than false? As I’ve explained, I think that we do have such reasons. Take a look at the transcripts of my Defenders (series 4) lessons on Natural Theology (parts 22-24) for my reasons.
These include Joshua Rasmussen’s “the Value Argument”:[1]
1. Some degree of value can be instantiated.
2. If some degree of value can be instantiated, then each degree of value can be instantiated.
3. Therefore each degree of value can be instantiated.
4. Maximal greatness is a degree of value.
5. Therefore, maximal greatness can be instantiated.
This disarmingly simple argument provides some non-question-begging, a posteriori support for the first premise of the ontological argument. For our moral experience reveals that some degree of value is, in fact, instantiated, whence it follows that (1). As for (2), Rasmussen notes that a mere difference in degree of a value does not affect the possibility or impossibility of a value of that degree. Rather there is plausibly a modal continuity for degrees of value. In support of (4), he claims that maximal greatness is a determinant of value; namely, it is a maximum value. Every determinant of value is a degree of value. So maximal greatness, as a degree of value, can be instantiated. I find the value argument very persuasive, and it increases my confidence that it is possible that a maximally great being exists.
[1] Joshua Rasmussen, “Plantinga,” in Ontological Arguments, ed. Graham Oppy, Classic Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 183-94.
- William Lane Craig