Doesn't the Kalam Imply a PERSONAL Cause?

Alex J. O'Connor, aka. (The) Cosmic Skeptic, objects that the Kalam doesn't merely imply a cause of the universe, but rather a specific type of cause.

MR. O'CONNOR: One of the objections that has been made, and I think I've made it in the past, is this idea that, yeah, the kalam cosmological argument gets you a cause of the universe. Right. But it doesn't get you something resembling a God. But here what we're doing is we're trying to show that in order, if we kind of admit that there is a cause of the universe that's outside of the universe and is therefore timeless, eternal, infinite, whatever it may be, that it does in fact have to be personal. It does in fact have to have free will and some form of consciousness, and so the kalam actually does imply a type of cause, not just a cause. Does that make sense?

DR. CRAIG: Well, it does to me. This is al-Ghazali's argument for the personhood of the cause of the universe. This isn't original with me; it's in al-Ghazali's work. When I first read it I thought this is absolutely brilliant. This is the only way that you can get a temporal effect with a beginning from a permanent cause – if you've got an agent endowed with freedom of the will who can choose to do something without antecedent determining conditions. Since that time I've enunciated two other arguments for the personhood of the creator, one from Richard Swinburne based upon the distinction between personal explanations and scientific explanations, and then another based upon the causal power of the cause of the universe – an unembodied mind is the best candidate for a timeless, spaceless, immaterial cause of the universe. So I've got three arguments all leading to the same conclusion that the cause of the universe is a personal, unembodied mind which is very close to a theistic concept.