Ontological Argument completely doesn't make sense and here is why

[UnreasonableFaith]

I sincirely can't understand why OA is even called an argument.

In other words, you don't understand what an argument is.

Once again I should be more precise.

Technically it is an argument, of course. The problem is, it's a very poor one, so poor in fact I wouldn't dare to even call it so. We can make an argument like:

P1. God exists or earth is flat
P2. Earth isn't flat
C. God exists

I wouldn't really mind if you said it's not argument at all.

You'd better tell all the philosophers who think that it isn't a "poor" argument then. Just let them know that some person on the internet is ready to correct them.

Anyway, Plantinga (if you've ever actually read him) says that the argument may be rationally rejected. His conclusion is that it is rational to accept the crucial premise, and the rest follows by way of modal logic. This is not disputable.

I think I don't share your respect towards mentioned philosophers. This kind of appeal to authority is quite common, people criticize MOA as presented by popular apologists, and then defenders come in and start claiming that, well REAL philosophers have it all worked out and it does its job. I can only wonder why these philosophers don't share their arguments more openly so they can be discussed as well. Also the last time I checked philosophers were quite consistent in belief that you can't prove the existence of some real new object simply by defining it in specific way. It only works, when you just switch names with already existing stuff, but it doesn't make much sense for obvious reasons.

I also disagree that it's rational to accept MOA premise. When I say X is possible I mean that it may exist in our world at some point in time, and in theory I don't see anything in laws of nature or laws of logic which would make X impossible. But it may be also the case that even though it's possible it never happend, and will never happen. And I may be just wrong in assesing this possibility. That's kind of possibility we always use. But that's not semantics use in MOA. And I don't see any reason to accept them. Obviously we can define notions however we want. We can even make this trick:

Earth is round<=>god exists

P1. Earth is round
C. God exists

it's rational to accept first premise and conclusion logically follows, but hmmm I doubt this argument would convince anyone. However I'm open to the possibility, that "rational" has completely different meaning in this case as well. Maybe rational means "it's logically possible" or something similar? After all playing around with definitions is fun.

At some very technical level Ican accept it's ok to define god as necessary, the problem is how apologists try to use this definition. The right way, which we always use is this:

1. Define object as possesing set o properties X and call it god
2. Find object with all these properties.
3. Now you can call it god.

So if you define god as necessary, then I'm sorry,you're not warranted in belief in your god before you actually check all possible worlds and indeed find this god there. How are you going to do that? I don't now, not my problem.

And for god's sake how am I supposed to respect philosophers, who add existence as property after all? Ba, not mere existence, but necessary existence, that is actual existence + existence in other worlds.

Let's define Y as possessing following properties:
1.It has all properties of banana
2.It exists

It means that if I find a banana which exists, I;m going to call it Y... But clearly we can see it's futile to define Y as existing, after all is it possible to ever locate banana which doesn't exist? The same goes for god.

So I'm sorry to say this again, until someone actually show me how MOA adds any bit of credibility to the existence of god I'm not going to treat it with more respect than it deserves.

[ParaclitosLogos]

I sincirely can't understand why OA is even called an argument.

In other words, you don't understand what an argument is.

Once again I should be more precise.

Technically it is an argument, of course. The problem is, it's a very poor one, so poor in fact I wouldn't dare to even call it so. We can make an argument like:

P1. God exists or earth is flat
P2. Earth isn't flat
C. God exists

I wouldn't really mind if you said it's not argument at all.

You'd better tell all the philosophers who think that it isn't a "poor" argument then. Just let them know that some person on the internet is ready to correct them.

Anyway, Plantinga (if you've ever actually read him) says that the argument may be rationally rejected. His conclusion is that it is rational to accept the crucial premise, and the rest follows by way of modal logic. This is not disputable.

I think I don't share your respect towards mentioned philosophers. This kind of appeal to authority is quite common, people criticize MOA as presented by popular apologists, and then defenders come in and start claiming that, well REAL philosophers have it all worked out and it does its job. I can only wonder why these philosophers don't share their arguments more openly so they can be discussed as well. Also the last time I checked philosophers were quite consistent in belief that you can't prove the existence of some real new object simply by defining it in specific way. It only works, when you just switch names with already existing stuff, but it doesn't make much sense for obvious reasons.

I also disagree that it's rational to accept MOA premise. When I say X is possible I mean that it may exist in our world at some point in time, and in theory I don't see anything in laws of nature or laws of logic which would make X impossible. But it may be also the case that even though it's possible it never happend, and will never happen. And I may be just wrong in assesing this possibility. That's kind of possibility we always use. But that's not semantics use in MOA. And I don't see any reason to accept them. Obviously we can define notions however we want. We can even make this trick:

Earth is round<=>god exists

P1. Earth is round
C. God exists

it's rational to accept first premise and conclusion logically follows, but hmmm I doubt this argument would convince anyone. However I'm open to the possibility, that "rational" has completely different meaning in this case as well. Maybe rational means "it's logically possible" or something similar? After all playing around with definitions is fun.

At some very technical level Ican accept it's ok to define god as necessary, the problem is how apologists try to use this definition. The right way, which we always use is this:

1. Define object as possesing set o properties X and call it god
2. Find object with all these properties.
3. Now you can call it god.

So if you define god as necessary, then I'm sorry,you're not warranted in belief in your god before you actually check all possible worlds and indeed find this god there. How are you going to do that? I don't now, not my problem.

And for god's sake how am I supposed to respect philosophers, who add existence as property after all? Ba, not mere existence, but necessary existence, that is actual existence + existence in other worlds.

Let's define Y as possessing following properties:
1.It has all properties of banana
2.It exists

It means that if I find a banana which exists, I;m going to call it Y... But clearly we can see it's futile to define Y as existing, after all is it possible to ever locate banana which doesn't exist? The same goes for god.

So I'm sorry to say this again, until someone actually show me how MOA adds any bit of credibility to the existence of god I'm not going to treat it with more respect than it deserves.

The problem is that to show you what you ask you need to be informed about many subjects you appear not to be informed about.

1. Modal logic
2. Possible world semantics
3. Perfect being theology
4. Contingency, necessity
5. Common a-priori and a-posteriori justificatory procedures
6. Main fallacies conditions (formal and informal)
7. Metaphysical, or broadly logical possibility, vs strict logical possibiliy, and physical possibility
8. Propositional logic
9. predicate logic
10. properties
11. compositionality
12. de re/de dicto distinction
13. Essentialism
14. Naturalness
15. Metaphysics
etc...

And of course, actually read the relevant work and understand it, properly enough.                                         

In that sense, the MOA is not a very good argument, but, it is a sound argument.

[UnreasonableFaith]

As I said first premise is unsound and makes MOA circular. "A being which exists in world 1, world 2, world 3, actual world, world 4,... world n, exists in some world i". Indeed if we accept premise which states "god exists in actual world" then it's quite easy to reach a conclusion that god in fact exists in actual world. And no amount of sophistry is going to change how MOA really looks like

[ParaclitosLogos]

As I said first premise is unsound and makes MOA circular. "A being which exists in world 1, world 2, world 3, actual world, world 4,... world n, exists in some world i". Indeed if we accept premise which states "god exists in actual world" then it's quite easy to reach a conclusion that god in fact exists in actual world. And no amount of sophistry is going to change how MOA really looks like

All you have said is that the argument is valid, no amount of missunderstanding can change  what the argument really does and is.

[UnreasonableFaith]

As I said first premise is unsound and makes MOA circular. "A being which exists in world 1, world 2, world 3, actual world, world 4,... world n, exists in some world i". Indeed if we accept premise which states "god exists in actual world" then it's quite easy to reach a conclusion that god in fact exists in actual world. And no amount of sophistry is going to change how MOA really looks like

All you have said is that the argument is valid, no amount of missunderstanding can change  what the argument really does and is.

I'm find with that. I'm not arguing against validity here. But if someone says "look, this argument is so good, now it's only a matter of what religion is true!" or even "Look, this argument makes it more likely that god exists" then I disagree with such use of MOA strongly.

[ParaclitosLogos]

As I said first premise is unsound and makes MOA circular. "A being which exists in world 1, world 2, world 3, actual world, world 4,... world n, exists in some world i". Indeed if we accept premise which states "god exists in actual world" then it's quite easy to reach a conclusion that god in fact exists in actual world. And no amount of sophistry is going to change how MOA really looks like

All you have said is that the argument is valid, no amount of missunderstanding can change  what the argument really does and is.

I'm find with that. I'm not arguing against validity here. But if someone says "look, this argument is so good, now it's only a matter of what religion is true!" or even "Look, this argument makes it more likely that god exists" then I disagree with such use of MOA strongly.

I would have to know what do you mean by "so good argument"   and "likely that" . Depending on what you mean by those, mabye, it´s not all that.

As far as I can see, the premises of the argument are plausible, on independent grounds (from the conclusion), and, since the argument is valid ( as we agree ) the conclusion is at least as plausible, which provides some justification to believe that there is a being much like the one that the main monotheists religions have envisioned for centuries, specially, Christian monotheism.

[UnreasonableFaith]

I think there is only one premise, the rest just unpack it, nevermind.

Yes, it's plausible that god exists. by plausible I mean that it's not impossible. So what? I don't see how MOA provides any justification for such belief. You have to accept its first premise which already assumes the existence of god. So basically you're saying that if you assume the existence of god, then you're justified in belief in god. How does it work? The sheer fact X isn't impossible doesn't justify belief in it by any reasonable standard.

Also there is nothing in MOA which gives you any god, let alone Christian one, where did you take it from? I can just switch omnibenevolence to omnimanevolence and voila. I can go step further and define some mystical creative energy as necessary. Or I can go even further and say that our reality exists necessary.

I always wonder. If let's say String Theory turns out to be the theory of everything and strings are most fundamental components of reality, what are proponents of MOA going to do? Call strings god? Argue that no, there is still something deeper, because they can imagine so? Or maybe physycists should add word "necessary" to all their theories? "Strings exist necessary, and you can't imagine world without them, because strings which don't exist aren't necessary so they are not subject of our discussion" or "It's possible that strings exists necessarily"?

[ParaclitosLogos]

I think there is only one premise, the rest just unpack it, nevermind.

Yes, it's plausible that god exists. by plausible I mean that it's not impossible. So what? I don't see how MOA provides any justification for such belief. You have to accept its first premise which already assumes the existence of god. So basically you're saying that if you assume the existence of god, then you're justified in belief in god. How does it work? The sheer fact X isn't impossible doesn't justify belief in it by any reasonable standard.

Also there is nothing in MOA which gives you any god, let alone Christian one, where did you take it from? I can just switch omnibenevolence to omnimanevolence and voila. I can go step further and define some mystical creative energy as necessary. Or I can go even further and say that our reality exists necessary.

I always wonder. If let's say String Theory turns out to be the theory of everything and strings are most fundamental components of reality, what are proponents of MOA going to do? Call strings god? Argue that no, there is still something deeper, because they can imagine so? Or maybe physycists should add word "necessary" to all their theories? "Strings exist necessary, and you can't imagine world without them, because strings which don't exist aren't necessary so they are not subject of our discussion" or "It's possible that strings exists necessarily"?

There are 3 premises:
1. Possibly, maximal greatness is exemplified
2. Necessarily, if maximal greatness is exemplified  then maximal excellence is exemplified in all worlds.
3 if (Possibly, maximal gretaness is exemplified , and,  Necessarily, if maximal greatness is exemplified, then,    maximal  excellence is exemplified in all worlds), then, actually, maximal excellence is s exemplified in all worlds.
4.  actually, maximal excellence is exemplified in all worlds.

1. Supported by Metaphysical intuition, and historical common usage of the natural concept of maximal greatness
2.  Supported by conceptual analysis of the concept of maximal greatness.
3.  supported by S5 system axiom 5


Thanks for the exchange.

[UnreasonableFaith]

Let me clear it up:

P1. A being which exists in all possible worlds (part of maximal greatness), including ours, exists in some possible world
P2. Not important, premise 1 is enough
P3. Not important, premise 1 is enough
C. Actually such being exists.

Justification:
1. Supported by Metaphysical intuition, and historical common usage of the natural concept of maximal greatness
2. Not important
3. Not important

Conclusion:
God exists.

And by the way it's christian god.

I'm sorry but it doesn't answer anything I wrote in my previous comment. That is examples of other things which may be necessary, plus what if one day physicists announced they got it, here is theory of everything, we can't get any deeper. What then?

Anyway, thanks for exchange too.

[ParaclitosLogos]

Let me clear it up:

P1. A being which exists in all possible worlds (part of maximal greatness), including ours, exists in some possible world
P2. Not important, premise 1 is enough
P3. Not important, premise 1 is enough
C. Actually such being exists.

Justification:
1. Supported by Metaphysical intuition, and historical common usage of the natural concept of maximal greatness
2. Not important
3. Not important

Conclusion:
God exists.

And by the way it's christian god.

I'm sorry but it doesn't answer anything I wrote in my previous comment. That is examples of other things which may be necessary, plus what if one day physicists announced they got it, here is theory of everything, we can't get any deeper. What then?

Anyway, thanks for exchange too.

This does not refute any of the premises, and,  it´s mere hand waving, and, does nothing to defeat the argument:

P1. A being which exists in all possible worlds (part of maximal greatness), including ours, exists in some possible world
P2. Not important, premise 1 is enough
P3. Not important, premise 1 is enough
C. Actually such being exists.

Justification:
1. Supported by Metaphysical intuition, and historical common usage of the natural concept of maximal greatness
2. Not important
3. Not important

Conclusion:
God exists.

And by the way it's christian god.

Such attitude deserves no attention

...what if one day physicists announced they got it, here is theory of everything, we can't get any deeper. What then?

What about it? this does not refute any of the premises.

I just realized you are just trolling.

Thanks for nothing.

[UnreasonableFaith]

This does not refute any of the premises, and,  it´s mere hand waving, and, does nothing to defeat the argument.

It shows how absurd first premise is. Seriously, what counts as defeating here? You just want me to accept that being which exists in all possible worlds including ours also exists in some possible world. No amount of metaphysical intuition is going to help here.

Such attitude deserve no attention

Well, I'm sorry for not being impressed by these sophisticated wordplays. 

You still didn't explain why MOA suggests christian god. What if being evil contributes to maximal excelence?

And why any personal being at all?

1. Object is maximally excellent if it's mystical, eternal ball of energy capable of creating universes
2. Object is maximally great if it's excellent in all possible worlds

And the rest goes on.

[ParaclitosLogos]

This does not refute any of the premises, and,  it´s mere hand waving, and, does nothing to defeat the argument.

It shows how absurd first premise is. Seriously, what counts as defeating here? You just want me to accept that being which exists in all possible worlds including ours also exists in some possible world. No amount of metaphysical intuition is going to help here.

Such attitude deserve no attention

Well, I'm sorry for not being impressed by these sophisticated wordplays. 

You still didn't explain why MOA suggests christian god. What if being evil contributes to maximal excelence?

And why any personal being at all?

1. Object is maximally excellent if it's mystical, eternal ball of energy capable of creating universes
2. Object is maximally great if it's excellent in all possible worlds

And the rest goes on.

What is intuition not going to help with?

It´s not wordplay, it is related to analytic philosophy jargon.

What if evil doesn´t  contribute to maximal excelence? questions are not objections nor defeaters.


It´s generally understood that a supreme , all perfect being, worthy of worship (as the Christian God is understood to be) is  omniscient and morally perfect, and eternal balls do not fit that description very well, rather it is implausible that they do, aside from it being somewhat an ad-hoc concept, with no common use nor any hint of  being a natural concept (in the Lewisian sense).

And the rest of your objections don´t go either. These puported objections your throw to the wall to see if they stick are all over the place and betray a lack of understanding of the subject.

So, forgive me if I am not impressed by so much sophistry and uninformed dismissiveness.

[UnreasonableFaith]

What is intuition not going to help with?

It´s not wordplay, it is related to analytic philosophy jargon.

I think it's sophisticated wordplay to say "it's possible that god exists" instead of "God who exists in all worlds including ours, exists in some possible world"
Or
 "It's possible Maximal greatness is exemplified" instead of  "Maximally excellent being which also happen to exists in all possible worlds including ours, exists in some possible world"

What if evil doesn´t  contribute to maximal excelence? questions are not objections nor defeaters.

Don't pretend you don't know what I meant.

It´s generally understood that a supreme , all perfect being, worthy of worship (as the Christian God is understood to be) is  omniscient and morally perfect, and eternal balls do not fit that description very well, rather it is implausible that they do, aside from it being somewhat an ad-hoc concept, with no common use nor any hint of  being a natural concept (in the Lewisian sense).

Seriously? Ok, then if it helps you, you can put X instead of maximal excellence, and Y instead of maximal greatness. All other things stay the same. I suppose laws of logics don't mind what word we use. Can you now respond? Is my belief in mystical ball of energy which creates universes justified now?

And I have no idea by what criteria you judge my concept as ad hoc. I don't even know what it means in this context. We're totally making things up, why my concept is more ad hoc than yours? From what I get it's because your is older with more rich tradition, but I hope it's not your explanation.

I can give another example:

1. Being X is diabolic if and only if it's omnipotent and evil
2. Being X is totally diabolic if and only if it's diabolic and it exists in every possible worlds.

Rest goes the same.

Does it make belief in an evil god more rational? If MOA has any value at all, than what I just wrote itself should add some credibility to my belief, if not then MOA itself is completely irrelevant, it's nothing more than complicated way of saying that if there are good reasons to believe in X, then you're justified in belief in X

[ParaclitosLogos]

What is intuition not going to help with?

It´s not wordplay, it is related to analytic philosophy jargon.

I think it's sophisticated wordplay to say "it's possible that god exists" instead of "God who exists in all worlds including ours, exists in some possible world"
Or
 "It's possible Maximal greatness is exemplified" instead of  "Maximally excellent being which also happen to exists in all possible worlds including ours, exists in some possible world"

What if evil doesn´t  contribute to maximal excelence? questions are not objections nor defeaters.

Don't pretend you don't know what I meant.

It´s generally understood that a supreme , all perfect being, worthy of worship (as the Christian God is understood to be) is  omniscient and morally perfect, and eternal balls do not fit that description very well, rather it is implausible that they do, aside from it being somewhat an ad-hoc concept, with no common use nor any hint of  being a natural concept (in the Lewisian sense).

Seriously? Ok, then if it helps you, you can put X instead of maximal excellence, and Y instead of maximal greatness. All other things stay the same. I suppose laws of logics don't mind what word we use. Can you now respond? Is my belief in mystical ball of energy which creates universes justified now?

And I have no idea by what criteria you judge my concept as ad hoc. I don't even know what it means in this context. We're totally making things up, why my concept is more ad hoc than yours? From what I get it's because your is older with more rich tradition, but I hope it's not your explanation.

I can give another example:

1. Being X is diabolic if and only if it's omnipotent and evil
2. Being X is totally diabolic if and only if it's diabolic and it exists in every possible worlds.

Rest goes the same.

Does it make belief in an evil god more rational? If MOA has any value at all, than what I just wrote itself should add some credibility to my belief, if not then it's completely irrelevant and the same goes for attempts to use MOA as justification for belief in other gods.

I know informally and colloquially the argument is put on terms as you are using here:
"it's possible that god exists" instead of "God who exists in all worlds including ours, exists in some possible world"

But, that´s not how stated the argument.

The argument as I stated is not about a being who exists in all worlds including ours, exists in some possible world, which is what you are attacking, but about a property that is possibly exemplified.

so you are attacking an strawman.


Don´t second read me. Look, only people with mental and cognitive problems, honestly and truely, think that evil is an excellent thing to be, and they belong behind white walls or bars, away from society. So, that´s just a nonsensical question, and, as I said questions are not objections, so, I have no clue what you are asking or trying to say with such a question.


What about this argument?
1. Object is X if it's mystical, eternal ball of energy capable of creating universes
2. Object is Y if it's  X in all possible worlds

The concept of God as a supreme and wholly perfect being was not made by me, it´s the concept of God Christians (and the other great monotheists religions) have developed for centuries.

I did not just made this today so I can score rethorical points in our exchange, like you are doing, with  ethernal balls and necessarily existing diabolic beings, namely, these are ad-hoc, unnatural, and not in common use concepts  you are making up just  (as you yourself admit) for the sake of sustaining your position.

On the later concept of a totally diabolic being that exists in every possible world, why think  total diabolicness requires exemplification in all possible worlds, what is the history of the concept? (barely any exists, if at all) has it survived scrutiny for centuries?   (not , it hasn´t)

This type of manichaean view of evil is not favored today, by philosophers that study the subject. So, why think it is possible? (answer, there is no reason)

These are no good objections, they missconstrue the argument with respect to modal epistemic matters.

[UnreasonableFaith]

I know informally and colloquially the argument is put on terms as you are using here:
"it's possible that god exists" instead of "God who exists in all worlds including ours, exists in some possible world"

But, that´s not how stated the argument.

The argument as I stated is not about a being who exists in all worlds including ours, exists in some possible world, which is what you are attacking, but about a property that is possibly exemplified.

so you are attacking an strawman.

When you say that property X is exemplified it means there is a possible world, in which object with property X exists.

When you say it's possible object Y exists, you mean there is a possible world in which we find object Y.

Maximall greatness include a necessary existence in all possible world.

To be honest I don't understand why you wrote "possibly, maximal greatness is exemplified", exemplified or possibly alone would be enough.

Don´t second read me. Look, only people with mental and cognitive problems, honestly and truely, think that evil is an excellent thing to be, and they belong behind white walls or bars, away from society. So, that´s just a nonsensical question, and, as I said questions are not objections, so, I have no clue what you are asking or trying to say with such a question.

If not for all these quite formally written posts of yours that I saw, I could indeed believe you have had a problem with a concept of  maximally excellent being whose property is omnimanevolence instead of omnibenevolence. But I saw them so to be honest I don't buy your excuse here.

What about this argument?
1. Object is X if it's mystical, eternal ball of energy capable of creating universes
2. Object is Y if it's  X in all possible worlds

The concept of God as a supreme and wholly perfect being was not made by me, it´s the concept of God Christians (and the other great monotheists religions) have developed for centuries.

It doesn't matter who created it, nor how long it took, now that it's already here. I hope you're not suggesting otherwise.

I did not just made this today so I can score rethorical points in our exchange, like you are doing, with  ethernal balls and necessarily existing diabolic beings, namely, these are ad-hoc, unnatural, and not in common use concepts  you are making up just  (as you yourself admit) for the sake of sustaining your position.

It doesn't matter whether concept is 1000 eyars old, or 10 hours long. MGB is made up too, and it's unnatural as well. Even if it wasn't what does it change? The fact it's common concept is an argument ad populum - useless. It's ad-hoc as well. However I still don't understand what does ad-hoc means in this context. nontheless given full analogy between our concepts it must be true that if mine is ad-hoc yours is too. Age doesn't affect it.

Generally speaking by your logic I just need to popularize my concepts for long enough, and then suddenly they become natural, and common, therefore more valuable that's your answer. It's total ad populum and "ad history". Or maybe you hope there are some laws of logic or nature which somehow prevent evil god from existence?

On the later concept of a totally diabolic being that exists in every possible world, why think  total diabolicness requires exemplification in all possible worlds, what is the history of the concept? (barely any exists, if at all) has it survived scrutiny for centuries?   (not , it hasn´t)

Again, historicity adds plausibility or credibility? Since when? And what kind of scrutiny do you mean? It's definition, and if it's coherent so what fault do you wish to find here? Or maybe you suggest there must be some independent evidence to support the existence of my defined object? That would count as admision of my point.

I don't have to explain why I think total diabolicness requires exemplification in all possible worlds, thats my definition. But if you wish, here is quick response - I think you're more diabolic if you cause evil in more than one world.

This type of manichaean view of evil is not favored today, by philosophers that study the subject. So, why think it is possible? (answer, there is no reason)

So you mean laws of logic or nature care whether your made up being is maximally good or maximally evil? That's interesting. Why do you think maximally good being is possible? Historicity, long time of development, tradition, popularity, etc. Aren't good answers here.

These are no good objections, they missconstrue the argument with respect to modal epistemic matters.

Well you still didn't respond to anything.

And you also didn't addres my hypothetical String theory example. Let's say strings always existed, and they are fundamental, let's say we have scientific proof for it. What then? Are you then going to call them god? Or are you going to claim that still, there must be something beyond them? Or maybe MOA proves that it's never going to be a case?