I cordially invite all persons interested in the resonblefaith.org forum topic ontological argument to read my recently published essay, “A Critique of the Plantinga Version of the Modal Ontological Argument,” accessible at http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/arnold_guminski/plantinga.html. The paper is also available at http://www.independent.academia.edu/ArnoldGuminski. The introduction to my paper reads:
In this paper I examine the modal ontological argument based upon possible worlds semantics expounded by Alvin Plantinga (PMOA) and further developed and defended by William Lane Craig. In section A I set forth the definitions and premises of the PMOA and its conclusions before disclosing its flawed underlying assumptions. In section B I expound and defend what I call the "anti - Plantinga modal ontological argument - argument" (or anti-PMOA-argument). There I rigorously show that, despite appearances, a maximally great being is not broadly logically possible. In section C I set forth why the anti-PMOA-argument is amply confirmed—namely, because the procedure used to construct the PMOA plausibly allows the construction of arguments relevantly similar to it, but inconsistent with it. Such rival arguments show the existence, in all possible worlds, of either (a) beings relevantly similar to, but different from, that of God conceived of as a maximally excellent being (as defined in the PMOA), or, more strikingly, (b) several conceivable maximally excellent beings that nevertheless constitutively or otherwise differ from each other in some important respects. Section D examines the nature of the modality involved in possible world semantics, in so doing explaining why the notion of what is broadly logically possible/necessary ought to be distinguished from the notion of what is metaphysically possible/necessary. Section E independently considers the plausibility of premise 1 of the PMOA (i.e., that it is possible that a maximally great being exists) according to the writings of other scholars.
