To the moderators.
A great percentage of my posting only happens after much reading and pondering of the literature I have available, and, most if it is posted in the spirit of philosophical conversation, to the best of my possibilities.
There are some participants in these forums that dedicate themselves to post answers that are uncharitable, non philosophically conducive and dialog shattering.
I offer one such example, below, but there are many, many more.
I would beg you to take notice of this situation, that even though a subtle issue, to me, is absolutely frustrating, given my interest in dialog and shared understanding.
Philosophical questions are not, for the most part, matters of yes and no. The dynamics that have settled on this forums have pushed away those that were openly recognized to put their best understanding and produce quality posts some years ago, others have not gone away, completely, but it is clear to many that their contributions are self consciously limited, plausibly not to spend themselves, too much, and find themselves in the same frustrating situation I find myself. Even though, I can not count myself among those, I still do my best to bring the best quality my limitations allow, I would have hoped this was valued in a place like this, but, that´s not how it looks like , to me.
Correct me if this is misguided, but from what I can tell after reading this thread, would it be wrong to say that all the MOA serves to prove is merely; that asserting <>[]G is basically as strong (if not as strong) as the assertion that []G, since it has been agreed that these two are logically equivalent. Rather than provide some sort of proof or evidence for []G, it just seems to prove that the assertion <>[]G is all the more controversial than one may previously have thought. I don't see how this argument has much persuasive power at all in supporting the claim that []G is in fact true, instead the MOA seems to inadvertently show why we should require very good reasons to accept the claim that <>[]G.
It seems to me that this argument seeks to exploit the weak/modest appearance or even the apparent obviousness (for the layman) of the claim that <>[]G, when all it does in the end is show just how controversial that claim is, and therefore why we would need sufficiently compelling reasons this argument does not provide, in order to believe this claim to be true. The proponent of the MOA hopes that the receiver of the argument won't be sensible enough to revise their position on the controversial nature of <>[]G and instead accept the conclusion []G, as if to helplessly fall into a booby trap.
Yes, this is missguided, If that was the case the same objection would apply to mathematical equations (e.g. F=ma, or Gvn + L *gvn = G *K* Tvn ) and anything that goes by s5 really.
Did you read the entire thread ?
If what was the case? I didn't think I was making an objection to mathematical equations. I was commenting on what I thought was the lack of persuasive power in proving []G just by showing that <>[]G is logically equivalent.
If we compare the MOA to mathematical equations like the examples you gave, then I was observing that simply showing that X = Y does nothing to show that X or Y is true, unless one can justify X to the same level of certainty as Y, and that one should be just as reserved in believing or claiming X as they are in believing or claiming Y.
Someone pointed out that <>[]G is coherent and this lends support to it, but then no denial was given of the coherency of <>[](~G) either, so coherency doesn't seem enough to accept <>[]G. So why think that <>[]G is any more likely to be true than <>[](~G)? Both claims seem equally coherent, equally intuitive, equally strong, and equally difficult to assert beyond any reasonable doubt. It seems to leave us literally at square one.
Again it really does seem to me that the level of persuasiveness of the MOA will be proportional to the level of confusion between epistemic possibility and subjunctive possibility. Even Craig himself seems to recognise the lack of persuasiveness of this argument (even though he is a proponent of it) and doesn't use it much in public debates (has he even used it in one debate?).
You are correct when you state that simply showing that X = Y does nothing to show that X or Y is true.
But there is some imprecision in your claim that "unless one can justify X to the same level of certainty as Y, and that one should be just as reserved in believing or claiming X as they are in believing or claiming Y."
If you can show that X=Y and find support enough to accept X is the case, then, it follows that Y is the case with the same level of support, at the very least.
Someone pointed out that <>[]G is coherent and this lends support to it, but then no denial was given of the coherency of <>[](~G) either, so coherency doesn't seem enough to accept <>[]G. So why think that <>[]G is any more likely to be true than <>[](~G)? Both claims seem equally coherent, equally intuitive, equally strong, and equally difficult to assert beyond any reasonable doubt. It seems to leave us literally at square one.
Again it really does seem to me that the level of persuasiveness of the MOA will be proportional to the level of confusion between epistemic possibility and subjunctive possibility. Even Craig himself seems to recognise the lack of persuasiveness of this argument (even though he is a proponent of it) and doesn't use it much in public debates (has he even used it in one debate?).
It is imprecise, also, to state that because it is possible that a MGB is coherent it lends support to it.
What lends support to the premise it is possible that a MGB exist is that the concept of a MGB is coherent.
As I have stated, I don´t think any one individual should have epistemic warrant to hold both, because, of how rational intuition works and how coherence work, specially, with respect to states of affaris that are either necessary or impossible.
If one is having a rational intuitions of a proposition p, that states that some concept A, wich is necessary or impossible, is coherent, in a given high cognitive state Level L, in a possetion of a richly enough concept repertoire C, such that if one were to seek a theory systematization of those intuitions, those systematizations would support p, and, such that for any other L' and C' , such that L' is greater than L and C' is contains C, and the given theory systematization would support p, then,
It is very plausibly the case that it is impossible that one would have intuitions of ~p for any L'' and C'' , where L'' is equal or greater than L, and C'' contains C.
The response:
Nothing about that resembles any sort of rational account of epistemic justification.
G is coherent.
~G is coherent.
Neither is evidence for <>G or ~<>G
So, I would like to ask you to pay more attention to the quality of posts we are getting,
in relation to the posts those posts are answering, and, their intent in relation of their
openness to dialog, specially philosophical.
I hope this does not fall in deaf ears.
