How can one provide epistemic justification for <>G?

[cnearing]

Specifically, "<> G" is the central premise in the Modal Ontological Argument.  It is equivalent to "Possibly, a maximally great being exists," or "A maximally great being exists in some possible world," or "Maximal greatness is instantiated in some possible world."

If you affirm this, what is your epistemic justification?

[ReasonableChilean]

Specifically, "<> G" is the central premise in the Modal Ontological Argument.  It is equivalent to "Possibly, a maximally great being exists," or "A maximally great being exists in some possible world," or "Maximal greatness is instantiated in some possible world."

If you affirm this, what is your epistemic justification?

Well, basically the argument is that if there's an all powerful entity to exist in some place of the multiverse. Since it is all powerful, the extent of its power will reach here.

The second part of the argument is that everything that can exist, exists somewhere in the multiverse.

It can be said that unicorns and Santa must exist in some place of the multiverse, but the extent of their influence cannot reach us.

I agree that this ontological argument is reasonable, but I think it reveals nothing about the nature of that all powerful entity other than its power.

[cnearing]

The ontological argument has nothing to do with a multiverse.  The "possible worlds" semantics does not refer to actual other worlds or dimensions or universes, but rather sets of propositions which describe some reality that doesn't violate the rules of logic or the "rules" of metaphysics.

[ParaclitosLogos]

Specifically, "<> G" is the central premise in the Modal Ontological Argument.  It is equivalent to "Possibly, a maximally great being exists," or "A maximally great being exists in some possible world," or "Maximal greatness is instantiated in some possible world."

If you affirm this, what is your epistemic justification?

1) Understanding of the concept of a MGB. (Modal epistemology , an account of modal intuitions based on understanding).

2) MA , certain moral truths are necessarily true.

3) Existence of God from the the truth and applicability of Mathematics.

4) repeated failure of showing that the the concept of a MGB is incoherent.

[cnearing]

None of that even begins to  approach epistemic justification for <>G

Might as well have just said apple, banana, taco, stuffing.

It would have borne exactly the same relevance to the question.

[ParaclitosLogos]

None of that even begins to  approach epistemic justification for <>G

Might as well have just said apple, banana, taco, stuffing.

It would have borne exactly the same relevance to the question.

I did not give much of an explanation, so, it is understandable that you might think that.

On the 1st point, epistemic accounts of modal intuitions are precisely accounts of how to justify premises like <> G. Which is what I am referring to.


On the 2nd point, I was referring to the idea  that  necessary moral facts would not be grounded on a naturalistic world view, and, thus, they would require that a wholly good being, God exists and necessarily so.

on the 3rd point , the argument is similar to the 2nd just on the basis of mathematical truths.


The 4th point is an inductive argument based on the repeated attempts and failures to the concept incoherent.

[cnearing]

None of that even begins to  approach epistemic justification for <>G

Might as well have just said apple, banana, taco, stuffing.

It would have borne exactly the same relevance to the question.

I did not give much of an explanation, so, it is understandable that you might think that.

On the 1st point, epistemic accounts of modal intuitions are precisely accounts of how to justify premises like <> G. Which is what I am referring to.

Your modal intuition has no epistemic weight.

On the 2nd point, I was referring to the idea  that  necessary moral facts would not be grounded on a naturalistic world view, and, thus, they would require that a wholly good being, God exists and necessarily so.




on the 3rd point , the argument is similar to the 2nd just on the basis of mathematical truths.

None of this is relevant.  It's also mostly false.

The 4th point is an inductive argument based on the repeated attempts and failures to the concept incoherent.

Nothing you wrote in your last post even resembles a logical inductive argument.  Sorry.  Its also not relevant.  G is coherent. This does not lend any weight to thr proposition that it is metaphysically possible.

[ParaclitosLogos]

None of that even begins to  approach epistemic justification for <>G

Might as well have just said apple, banana, taco, stuffing.

It would have borne exactly the same relevance to the question.

I did not give much of an explanation, so, it is understandable that you might think that.

On the 1st point, epistemic accounts of modal intuitions are precisely accounts of how to justify premises like <> G. Which is what I am referring to.

1) Your modal intuition has no epistemic weight.

On the 2nd point, I was referring to the idea  that  necessary moral facts would not be grounded on a naturalistic world view, and, thus, they would require that a wholly good being, God exists and necessarily so.




2) on the 3rd point , the argument is similar to the 2nd just on the basis of mathematical truths.

None of this is relevant.  It's also mostly false.

The 4th point is an inductive argument based on the repeated attempts and failures to the concept incoherent.

Nothing you wrote in your last post even resembles a logical inductive argument.  Sorry.  Its also not relevant.  G is coherent. This does not lend any weight to thr proposition that it is metaphysically possible.

Please, do not split the posts, it is disorderly, and, it does not help reading your comments.


1) The OP asked the following question : If you affirm this, what is your epistemic justification?

My modal intuitions have epistemic weight in MY epistemic justification, and it is in line with current accounts of modal intuition providing justification.


2) & 3) it is relevant, and, you act is someone died and made you epistmic king of your modal world. I am trying to give a high level explanation  of where I (and sometimes others) look some support and justificationfor the possibility premises.

Your opinion is not really relevant, at all.


4) Thanks for admiting that G is coherent. it does  lend support  that it is metaphysically possible.
Just like any other possibility question is connected to the coherence of the object of that question.

[cnearing]

Your intuition does lend weight to <>G even for you.

You are looking for justification in a place that is conceptuall unable to provide justification for your claim.  Digging for gold in a sandbox.

The fact thay G is coherent does not lend any support to <>G

If you think it does, demonstrate this logically.

[cnearing]

I mean honestly--would you honestly accept chaff like that from me?

My intuition says that <>G is false.  Am I now justified in rejecting theism?  Of course not, yet you ask me to accept a functionally equivalent bit of reasoning from you.

No.  Of c

[ParaclitosLogos]

Your intuition does not lend weight to <>G even for you.

You are looking for justification in a place that is conceptuall unable to provide justification for your claim.  Digging for gold in a sandbox.

The fact thay G is coherent does not lend any support to <>G

If you think it does, demonstrate this logically.

It is just an assertion to say "Your intuition does not lend weight to <>G even for you.", I am citing current research on Modal epistemology.

Demonstrate logically that your perceptions lend support to anything as true.

Demonstrate logically that your grasping of 2+2=4 lends support for accepting as true.

If you know all the answers why even ask?

[cnearing]

Your intuition does not lend weight to <>G even for you.

You are looking for justification in a place that is conceptuall unable to provide justification for your claim.  Digging for gold in a sandbox.

The fact thay G is coherent does not lend any support to <>G

If you think it does, demonstrate this logically.

It is just an assertion to say "Your intuition does not lend weight to <>G even for you.", I am citing current research on Modal epistemology.

Demonstrate logically that your perceptions lend support to anything as true.

Demonstrate logically that your grasping of 2+2=4 lends support for accepting as true.

If you know all the answers why even ask?

Actually, you haven't cited anything. Though the idea that there  even *can* be "research" on "modal epistemology" is pretty hilarious.  Tell me,h ow do you "research" modal epistemology? 

My your first question is imprecise and your second question is actually gibberish.

I understand your need to lash out here, but perhaps taking a moment and actually collecting your thoughts and trying to provide some semblance of justification for your own assertions might work better than substituting poorly-planned offense in the place of defense.

[ParaclitosLogos]

Your intuition does not lend weight to <>G even for you.

You are looking for justification in a place that is conceptuall unable to provide justification for your claim.  Digging for gold in a sandbox.

The fact thay G is coherent does not lend any support to <>G

If you think it does, demonstrate this logically.

It is just an assertion to say "Your intuition does not lend weight to <>G even for you.", I am citing current research on Modal epistemology.

Demonstrate logically that your perceptions lend support to anything as true.

Demonstrate logically that your grasping of 2+2=4 lends support for accepting as true.

If you know all the answers why even ask?

Actually, you haven't cited anything. Though the idea that there  even *can* be "research" on "modal epistemology" is pretty hilarious.  Tell me,h ow do you "research" modal epistemology? 

My your first question is imprecise and your second question is actually gibberish.

I understand your need to lash out here, but perhaps taking a moment and actually collecting your thoughts and trying to provide some semblance of justification for your own assertions might work better than substituting poorly-planned offense in the place of defense.

I cited on my 1st post reseach on modal accounts on my 1st point (in parenthesis).

Since, you haven´t said anything of substance, thanks for the exchange.

[cnearing]

Again no, you haven't cited any research. That is flatly false.  Do you know what a citation is?

Assuming you won't answer that,

"Since, you haven´t said anything of substance, thanks for the exchange."

Likewise.

[ParaclitosLogos]

Again no, you haven't cited any research. That is flatly false.  Do you know what a citation is?

Assuming you won't answer that,

"Since, you haven´t said anything of substance, thanks for the exchange."

Likewise.

1.  Laurence Bonjour’s (1998) In Defense of Pure Reason

2.  George Bealer’s (2002) The Rationalist Renaissance

3. Keith Hossack’s (2007) The Metaphysics of Knowledge

4. Jonathan Ichikawa and Benjamin Jarvis’s (2011) Rational Imagination and Modal Knowledge

5. Christian Nimtz’s (2012) Conceptual Truths, Strong Possibilities, and Metaphysical Necessity.