None of that even begins to approach epistemic justification for <>G
Might as well have just said apple, banana, taco, stuffing.
It would have borne exactly the same relevance to the question.
I did not give much of an explanation, so, it is understandable that you might think that.
On the 1st point, epistemic accounts of modal intuitions are precisely accounts of how to justify premises like <> G. Which is what I am referring to.
On the 2nd point, I was referring to the idea that necessary moral facts would not be grounded on a naturalistic world view, and, thus, they would require that a wholly good being, God exists and necessarily so.
on the 3rd point , the argument is similar to the 2nd just on the basis of mathematical truths.
The 4th point is an inductive argument based on the repeated attempts and failures to the concept incoherent.