The Modal Ontological Argument Begs the Question

[cnearing]

We have pointed to three key flaws in Anselm's reasoning, now, regardless of his metaphysical assumptions.

[jockito]

Ok, I already tried to answered your worry about coherence (/c/MGB , /c/~MGB) providing evidence for both <>MGB and <>~MGB.

But, I will concede it probably was a somewhat obscrure explanation. Let me see if I can try to clarify further.

This is my answer to that worry:

As I have stated,  I don´t think any one individual should have epistemic warrant to hold both, because, of how rational intuition works and how coherence works, specially, with respect to states of affairs that are either necessary or impossible.

If one is having a rational intuitions of  a proposition p, that states that some concept A, wich is necessary or impossible, is coherent, in a given high cognitive state Level L, in a possetion of a richly enough concept repertoire C, such that if one were to seek a theory systematization of those intuitions, those systematizations would support p, and, such that for any other L' and C' , such that L' is greater than L and C' is contains C, and the given theory systematization would support p, then,

It is very plausibly the case that it is impossible that one would have intuitions of  ~p for any L'' and C'' , where L'' is equal or greater than L, and C'' contains C.

The point is that at a given state of affairs where one has sufficient understanding of a concept, in good cognitive condition, understanding of a concept that if it obtains it does so  necessarily (and if does not it is impossible that it does), in such a way that at that level of  cognitive conditions or any other level better than the former one finds the concept coherent, this is understood to provide  good evidence for the possibility of the concept.

There are many details that could be fleshed out, but, at this point, it is important to understand the heuristics I described above, any greater cognitive level or condition , in the heuristics I described, will confirm the coherence, this is what is called a-priori estability, in epistemology.   

In the case that one establishes with a-priori estability the coherence of a concept, a concept that if obtains obtains necessarily, then the negation of the concept could not appear to be coherent (since it is impossible), at any such a level of cognition or higher, this is proscribed by the heuristics of a-priori estability  determination.

Assuming this is roughly correct, those who assert that a concept that if obtains, obtains necessarily is coherent and also its negation, evidently have not attain a-priori estability , and thus, their conclusions are not to be taken as reliable evidence for either conclusion.

Imagine for example the concept of the arithmetic operation 24+36=60 (a necessary truth), or the concept of a cubic sphere, purportedly a person who understands determinately with a-priori estability will not find both
24+36=60  and NOT 24+36=60 coherent, when the person has arrived to the sufficient cognitive understanding ( determinate understanding) with a-priori estability of the concept of 24+36=60, as long as the person is in such level of cognition and understanding or better , the person will find 24+26=60 coherent, and not its negation, and, the same goes for the cubic sphere example (though in this case, the result will be that it is incoherent).

If someone finds both  24+36=60 and NOT 24+36=60 coherent we can say that person has not arrived at the sufficient level of understanding and cognition with respect to the concept of the arithmetic operation 24+36=60, and, we should not take his conclusion as reliable evidence for either conclusion.


I hope this clarifies what I am saying, with respect to the worry of the double evidence for necessary concepts and their negations.

PS: I am not a philosopher, not even an student. I am an Engineer by day, I just like reading about these subjects, the former pays beter, the later is for enjoyment.

If I can try to boil this down; you're saying as long as we start with MGB and show it's coherence, it just follows that ~MGB must be incoherent - at least for the person holding that MGB is coherent. This is what I understand from your explanation above. But I don't see what is to stop someone from starting with ~MGB and equally showing the MGB must therefore be incoherent. This is what I'm not getting. I don't get the asymmetry. I see rather symmetry between the MGB argument and the ~MGB argument. If both can succeed to the same degree, it seems they are both equally weak to the same degree. In your examples of arithmetic, you started with 24 + 36 = 60 and showed that it's negation is incoherent. How is the starting with MGB as opposed to ~MGB not arbitrary? In the formulation of the argument for ~MGB, we do start with this concept - and so perhaps this serves to show that MGB in fact is the culprit who isn't coherent.

So in granting that,
- coherence is a necessary condition for establishing possibility
- the coherency of MGB and ~MGB are mutually exclusive

Which is what I take it you have explained thus far (?)

Still, I feel left thinking that the argument for MGB is equally as weak as the argument for ~MGB, in so far as one starts with either the concept of MGB or ~MGB. What am I missing here? Do you grant that, aside from external reasons, the mirror MOA is essentially the same in strength as the MOA?

[Jenna Black]

Whether or not something is instantiated is not part of a concept.
Existence is not a predicate. 

This is another famous (and entirely successful) objection to Anselm's argument.

Honestly, Anselm's argument has been so thoroughly dead for so long it's a little surprising to me anyone try to defend it.

I'm not defending Anselm's argument: I'm merely pointing out my interpretation of its meaning and significance.

[ParaclitosLogos]

Ok, I already tried to answered your worry about coherence (/c/MGB , /c/~MGB) providing evidence for both <>MGB and <>~MGB.

But, I will concede it probably was a somewhat obscrure explanation. Let me see if I can try to clarify further.

This is my answer to that worry:

As I have stated,  I don´t think any one individual should have epistemic warrant to hold both, because, of how rational intuition works and how coherence works, specially, with respect to states of affairs that are either necessary or impossible.

If one is having a rational intuitions of  a proposition p, that states that some concept A, wich is necessary or impossible, is coherent, in a given high cognitive state Level L, in a possetion of a richly enough concept repertoire C, such that if one were to seek a theory systematization of those intuitions, those systematizations would support p, and, such that for any other L' and C' , such that L' is greater than L and C' is contains C, and the given theory systematization would support p, then,

It is very plausibly the case that it is impossible that one would have intuitions of  ~p for any L'' and C'' , where L'' is equal or greater than L, and C'' contains C.

The point is that at a given state of affairs where one has sufficient understanding of a concept, in good cognitive condition, understanding of a concept that if it obtains it does so  necessarily (and if does not it is impossible that it does), in such a way that at that level of  cognitive conditions or any other level better than the former one finds the concept coherent, this is understood to provide  good evidence for the possibility of the concept.

There are many details that could be fleshed out, but, at this point, it is important to understand the heuristics I described above, any greater cognitive level or condition , in the heuristics I described, will confirm the coherence, this is what is called a-priori estability, in epistemology.   

In the case that one establishes with a-priori estability the coherence of a concept, a concept that if obtains obtains necessarily, then the negation of the concept could not appear to be coherent (since it is impossible), at any such a level of cognition or higher, this is proscribed by the heuristics of a-priori estability  determination.

Assuming this is roughly correct, those who assert that a concept that if obtains, obtains necessarily is coherent and also its negation, evidently have not attain a-priori estability , and thus, their conclusions are not to be taken as reliable evidence for either conclusion.

Imagine for example the concept of the arithmetic operation 24+36=60 (a necessary truth), or the concept of a cubic sphere, purportedly a person who understands determinately with a-priori estability will not find both
24+36=60  and NOT 24+36=60 coherent, when the person has arrived to the sufficient cognitive understanding ( determinate understanding) with a-priori estability of the concept of 24+36=60, as long as the person is in such level of cognition and understanding or better , the person will find 24+26=60 coherent, and not its negation, and, the same goes for the cubic sphere example (though in this case, the result will be that it is incoherent).

If someone finds both  24+36=60 and NOT 24+36=60 coherent we can say that person has not arrived at the sufficient level of understanding and cognition with respect to the concept of the arithmetic operation 24+36=60, and, we should not take his conclusion as reliable evidence for either conclusion.


I hope this clarifies what I am saying, with respect to the worry of the double evidence for necessary concepts and their negations.

PS: I am not a philosopher, not even an student. I am an Engineer by day, I just like reading about these subjects, the former pays beter, the later is for enjoyment.

If I can try to boil this down; you're saying as long as we start with MGB and show it's coherence, it just follows that ~MGB must be incoherent - at least for the person holding that MGB is coherent. This is what I understand from your explanation above. But I don't see what is to stop someone from starting with ~MGB and equally showing the MGB must therefore be incoherent. This is what I'm not getting. I don't get the asymmetry. I see rather symmetry between the MGB argument and the ~MGB argument. If both can succeed to the same degree, it seems they are both equally weak to the same degree. In your examples of arithmetic, you started with 24 + 36 = 60 and showed that it's negation is incoherent. How is the starting with MGB as opposed to ~MGB not arbitrary? In the formulation of the argument for ~MGB, we do start with this concept - and so perhaps this serves to show that MGB in fact is the culprit who isn't coherent.

So in granting that,
- coherence is a necessary condition for establishing possibility
- the coherency of MGB and ~MGB are mutually exclusive

Which is what I take it you have explained thus far (?)

Still, I feel left thinking that the argument for MGB is equally as weak as the argument for ~MGB, in so far as one starts with either the concept of MGB or ~MGB. What am I missing here? Do you grant that, aside from external reasons, the mirror MOA is essentially the same in strength as the MOA?

Would it make any difference in your evaluation of the coherence of  24+36=60, if you evaluate NOT 24+36=60 first, with a-priori stability? of course it does not, if you understand determinately 24+36=60 , NOT 24+36=60 will appear to you clearly incoherent.


If you find the concept of a MGB incoherent, with a-priori stability, that´s fine, but, as I think I showed it is impossible that then you find  the concept of a MGB coherent, at that same level of determinate understanding of the concept  of a MGB or at a better level of understanding.

I am not arguing, at the moment, for either conclusion being correct, merely, I am making  it clear, that claims from any one individual of finding both MGB coherent and incoherent are rather evidence of poor cognition, or incomplete understanding of the concept, or both, on the part of that individual.

[cnearing]

Whether or not something is instantiated is not part of a concept.
Existence is not a predicate. 

This is another famous (and entirely successful) objection to Anselm's argument.

Honestly, Anselm's argument has been so thoroughly dead for so long it's a little surprising to me anyone try to defend it.

I'm not defending Anselm's argument: I'm merely pointing out my interpretation of its meaning and significance.

Fair enough. 

[jockito]

Would it make any difference in your evaluation of the coherence of  24+36=60, if you evaluate NOT 24+36=60 first, with a-priori stability? of course it does not, if you understand determinately 24+36=60 , NOT 24+36=60 will appear to you clearly incoherent.


If you find MGB incoherent, with a-priori stability, that´s fine, but, as I think I showed it is impossible that then you find MGB coherent, at that same level of determinate understanding of a MGB or better.

I am not arguing, at the moment, for either way, merely making clear, that claims of any specific person of finding both MGB coherent and incoherent are rather evidence of poor cognition.

If as I seem to interpret you saying, coherence of MGB negates the coherence of ~MGB, it seems what you are suggesting is that the MOA can be boiled down further to;

1) MGB is coherent
2) therefore its negation ~MGB is incoherent, and thus impossible
4) therefore MGB exists

This would mean one doesn't even need to show that MGB is possible, just coherent. Are you suggesting this is the case?

[ParaclitosLogos]

Would it make any difference in your evaluation of the coherence of  24+36=60, if you evaluate NOT 24+36=60 first, with a-priori stability? of course it does not, if you understand determinately 24+36=60 , NOT 24+36=60 will appear to you clearly incoherent.


If you find MGB incoherent, with a-priori stability, that´s fine, but, as I think I showed it is impossible that then you find MGB coherent, at that same level of determinate understanding of a MGB or better.

I am not arguing, at the moment, for either way, merely making clear, that claims of any specific person of finding both MGB coherent and incoherent are rather evidence of poor cognition.

If as I seem to interpret you saying, coherence of MGB negates the coherence of ~MGB, it seems what you are suggesting is that the MOA can be boiled down further to;

1) MGB is coherent
2) therefore its negation ~MGB is incoherent, and thus impossible
4) therefore MGB exists

This would mean one doesn't even need to show that MGB is possible, just coherent. Are you suggesting this is the case?

No, that´s not what I am saying, you are getting ahead of yourself, all I have been talking about has been the epistemic situation, when it comes to supporting the possibility premise.

My focus has been completely on how the evidence in favor or against of the possibility premise of the argument works.

There is a larger process in the evaluation of the argument, but, focusing on the conclusion instead on the more specific and localized issue of supporting the premise, as you seem to be doing, runs the risk of begging the question.




There is  a BIG difference between :

1. it is possible that maximal greatness is co-exemplified

2. if  it is possible that maximal greatness is co-exemplified then maximal greatness is co-exemplified in the actual world.

3. maximal greatness is co-exemplified in the actual world.

Support:
the 2nd premise is true on the basis of axiom 5 of the modal system S5
and, the 1st premise depends on the modal epistemic support, provided for it(e.g. if the concept of maximal greatness coherent? ,etc...).

And then: We find that  understood determinately with a-priori stability, the concept of maximal greatness is coherent.

Then, we have good evidence that supports the 1st premise   

Finally: If we have good evidence to support the 1st premise (and the 2nd premise is established through axiom 5 of system S5) , and, there is no other outstanding evidence against it, then,  we have good reason to accept the the conclusion.

This is roughly correct

And

1) MGB is coherent
2) therefore its negation ~MGB is incoherent, and thus impossible
4) therefore MGB exists

This is completely fallacious.

Now,  that this is clear.  let´s go back to the matter at hand.

As we have seen

K1: one individual, I1, can find the concept of maximal greatness incoherent, while understanding it determinately, with a-priori stability, but, this implies that if so, this same person will not find the concept of maximal greatness coherent, while understanding it determinately, with a-priori stability.

OR Viceversa.

K2: one individual, I1 , can find the concept of maximal greatness coherent, while understanding it determinately, with a-priori stability, but, this implies that if so, this same person will not find the concept of maximal greatness incoherent, while understanding it determinately, with a-priori stability.

Either K1 or K2 not both can be the case.


If it should happen that (~K)  if a person, I1,  finds the concept of maximal greatness incoherent and the same person finds the concept of maximal greateness coherent, it is not while understanding the concept of maximal greatness determinately nor with a-priori stability, and, this is not evidence in favor nor against the possibility of maximal greatness being co-exemplified, but, evidence that the person, I1,  is in a non good enough cognitive sitution, or does not understand sufficiently the concept of a maximal greatness, or both, and, should refrain from reaching a conclusion either way, and, others should not give any weight in favor or against the possibility premise on the basis of I´s conclusions.



And, to evaluate correctly the coherence or incoherence of maximal greatness, the individual will need to better his cognitive situation, enlarge his relavent conceptual repertoire, as to improve the quality of his relevant cognition and the quantity of his relevant (categorial ) cognition, and then add further relevant specific (non-categorial ) information to his structure of beliefs, to be able to understand determinately , with a -priori stability, while holding that either  Maximal greatness is coherent (or incoherent - exclusivey)



I think, this much is clear, now.

[jockito]

I think, this much is clear, now.

Yes, you've explained a lot and given much food for thought, thanks. It has certainly got me thinking about the coherency of MGB, and whether this is true or not. As it stands, I'm agnostic about it, and now, more than before, am sceptical of its coherency.

[ParaclitosLogos]

I think, this much is clear, now.

Yes, you've explained a lot and given much food for thought, thanks. It has certainly got me thinking about the coherency of MGB, and whether this is true or not. As it stands, I'm agnostic about it, and now, more than before, am sceptical of its coherency.

As long as you have understood that claims of the so called symmetry between the possibility premises and its negation is just evidence of poor thinking, great.

[jockito]

I think, this much is clear, now.

Yes, you've explained a lot and given much food for thought, thanks. It has certainly got me thinking about the coherency of MGB, and whether this is true or not. As it stands, I'm agnostic about it, and now, more than before, am sceptical of its coherency.

As long as you have understood that claims of the so called symmetry between the possibility premises and its negation is just evidence of poor thinking, great.

Yes. I read this article http://www.defenseofreason.com/modal-ontological-argument/ and think the quote below summarises it fairly well, although you have gone into a lot more detail.

4B. Swapping premises

Some people argue that swapping out Premise 1 and replacing it with “It is possible that God does not exist” logically equates to being the same assertion as the original Premise 1, but that the simple change in phrasing would make the MOA’s logic prove that God does not exist. Because of this, they claim, the argument is obviously flawed and does not prove either conclusion.

But this objection is invalid. The conclusion of the MOA is already reached upon accepting the argument’s definition of God.

Once the definition of God is accepted as coherent and not at odds with any evidence in the real world that would render it impossible, the proposition “It is possible that God does not exist” is not a claim that can be made. It would lead to a contradiction immediately because God, by definition, is necessary (i.e. in Possible World semantics: God does exist in all possible worlds).

Consider if something like the number 5 or the notion of a square were the subject of this argument instead of God. If you accept the notion that it is inherently “necessary” (that is must exist by virtue of its nature), then there is no way to refute its existence. Stating that it is possible that it does not exist would be nonsense.

The same is true for the definition of God in this argument. So the question we need to focus on is this:

Is it actually coherent that the definition of God includes the property of being necessary?

The same article raises an issue with necessary existence being considered a "property", and argues that this isn't used in a coherent way in the MOA. I'm considering starting a new thread discussing the question of whether or not necessary existence is a property.

[ParaclitosLogos]

Ok.thanks for the exchange.