The Modal Ontological Argument Begs the Question

[cnearing]

Indeed, ~G trivially passes every standard heuristical test for possibility you might throw at it *unless you assume that G is necessary.*

[cnearing]

So, to think of it another way:

If the only goal of the MOA were to show that, under s5 and the stipulated definition of the MGB (both of which are perfectly reasonable, I think) that the existence of an MGB and the possibility of an MGB are just the same thing, then that's great.  I agree.  That's what I shoe in my first four premises


But that isn't how the MOA is used.

It is used to frame the rhetorical suggestion that belief in God can be justified by way of some fairly standard heuristics for evaluating possibility (like coherent cobceptualization).  That there is some route to justified belief through a much easier-to-meet standard stemming from this sort of metaphysical speculation.

And this is trivially false.

In fact, what the MOA proves is that this is *not* the case.  Not that it *is* the case.  The MOA illustrates a critical weakness in that sort of informal heuristic, in fact.

And that's why we need to call out the MOA for not just being circular (which is trivial) but for being *viciously* circular, or being used to beg the question in a rhetorical context.


It is presented as though it served to demonstrate that proving God is no more difficult than proving the possibility of God, and this is true, but the rhetorical implication here is completely wrong.

Indeed, it also proves that proving the possibility of God is no easier than proving the necessity of God.

The argument doesn't change what justification is required for one's belief in God.  All it does is show that the justification required for belief in even the mere possibility of God is the same.

[ParaclitosLogos]

So, to think of it another way:

If the only goal of the MOA were to show that, under s5 and the stipulated definition of the MGB (both of which are perfectly reasonable, I think) that the existence of an MGB and the possibility of an MGB are just the same thing, then that's great.  I agree.  That's what I shoe in my first four premises


But that isn't how the MOA is used.

It is used to frame the rhetorical suggestion that belief in God can be justified by way of some fairly standard heuristics for evaluating possibility (like coherent cobceptualization).  That there is some route to justified belief through a much easier-to-meet standard stemming from this sort of metaphysical speculation.

And this is trivially false.

In fact, what the MOA proves is that this is *not* the case.  Not that it *is* the case.  The MOA illustrates a critical weakness in that sort of informal heuristic, in fact.

And that's why we need to call out the MOA for not just being circular (which is trivial) but for being *viciously* circular, or being used to beg the question in a rhetorical context.


It is presented as though it served to demonstrate that proving God is no more difficult than proving the possibility of God, and this is true, but the rhetorical implication here is completely wrong.

Indeed, it also proves that proving the possibility of God is no easier than proving the necessity of God.

The argument doesn't change what justification is required for one's belief in God.  All it does is show that the justification required for belief in even the mere possibility of God is the same.

The modal formulation of the argument can´t show anything much about the epistemic resources that can be used to come to justify and know its premises, anymore than any other argument does.


Metaphysical possibility is determined by a-priori modal intuition, that´s not part nor parcel of the MOA or any other individual argument with modal premises.

Your argument is a non sequitur.

The argument is a deductive argument if the premises are true the conclusion follows with logical force.

the question is then

Is S5 with its 5 axiom the correct modality for metaphysical possibility and necessity?   (A question about modality , the epistemic of metaphysics and logic )

Is the concept of a MGB metaphysically possible? (an epistemic question).

Those questions are neither easy nor easier than many others in philosophy.

[ParaclitosLogos]

Simply, none of the things you mentioned constitute support for p2 in your simple reformation except where the constitute identical support for the conclusion.

Precisely, this is the case because one cannot be justified in asserting <>P unless one is justified in asserting ~([](~(p))) as I explained above.

This is true as per the definition of "<>."

No support for p2 which does not establish this fact could ever be sufficient for p2.

And once this fact is established, p2 is pointless.  The conclusion has already been reached.

I already explicited epistemic resources used for supporting P2 different from P3.

Modal epistemology to justify P3, directly, rather it´s justification goes to P2 and then transmission of justification through deductive inference does the rest (like in any other deductive argument).

Your answer is just "No"

The discussion just ends here.

[ParaclitosLogos]

And, of course we see this illustrated nicely by the reverse MOA:

1.) If <>(~G) then ~G
2.) <>(~G)
C.) ~G

1, again, is just s5. 

On what grounds can you object to p2?

It is intuitively true.  The coherence of (~G) is not in question.

What constitutes ~G ?

[cnearing]

<<Metaphysical possibility is determined by a-priori modal intuition, >>

This is meaningless.  This isn't a method for determining anything.

Might as well say, "metaphysical possibility is determined by consulting the quartzite metaphysical divining rod".

Metaphysical possibility is determined by determining whether a concept meets the definition of metaphysical possibility.

Which is impossible to do, because metaphysical possibility is poorly defined.

It's not a useful system.

Be that as it may, my point--and, indeed, any point about question begging--revolves around epistemic warrant, and my argument is that the premise <>G demands exactly the same warrant as the question of interest does: G or ~G

The MOA does nothing at all to change the epistemic conditions surrounding the question of interest.

It is literally circular.

It literally begs the question.

In what sense, then, is it worth anything beyond accomplishing what the first four lines of my argument accomplish? 

Also, <>(~G) is "possibly, God is not instantiated."

[cnearing]

How do your define "metaphysical intuition?"

How do you distinguish "metaphysical intuition" from "guessing?"

What is the connection between metaphysical intuition and truth?

I have never encountered any answer to any of these questions, and everything I have read in the subject has only deepended my suspicion that "metaphysical intuition" is just a fancy word for "guesswork," used by people who aren't capable of offering more than a guess, but who desperately want to appear to others as though they are.

[ParaclitosLogos]

<<Metaphysical possibility is determined by a-priori modal intuition, >>

This is meaningless.  This isn't a method for determining anything.

Might as well say, "metaphysical possibility is determined by consulting the quartzite metaphysical divining rod".

Metaphysical possibility is determined by determining whether a concept meets the definition of metaphysical possibility.

Which is impossible to do, because metaphysical possibility is poorly defined.

It's not a useful system.

Be that as it may, my point--and, indeed, any point about question begging--revolves around epistemic warrant, and my argument is that the premise <>G demands exactly the same warrant as the question of interest does: G or ~G

The MOA does nothing at all to change the epistemic conditions surrounding the question of interest.

It is literally circular.

It literally begs the question.

In what sense, then, is it worth anything beyond accomplishing what the first four lines of my argument accomplish? 

Also, <>(~G) is "possibly, God is not instantiated."

When I said <<Metaphysical possibility is determined by a-priori modal intuition, >> I meant its epistemic support.

That a concept is not well defined is not a impediment for epistemic support. Philosphy has a long tradition of treating concepts by way of case wise exemplification, with out needing final definitions.

Take Knowledge, a definition of what it is has not yet been given, nor agreed, still epistemology is a thriving practice.

This is not to say that what the concept of metaphysically possible is problematic at all. Large volumes of philosophy has been develope on the basis of it.

Your answer is stil "No".

From an epistemological point of view both Lowe and Hale provide a picture of our knowledge of modality that sharply contrasts with accounts that take conceivability or intuition to be our fundamental source of justification for believing metaphysically modal truths. The core contrast, for example with conceivability, is that modal knowledge derives from essentialist knowledge, and that conceivability is explained as being successful only in virtue of our possession of essentialist knowledge that is unpacked in a conceivability exercise.

Some references

Björnsson, Gunnar, 2004, “A Naturalist’s Approach to Modal Intuitions”, in Weber & De Mey 2004: 77–92.

Levin, Janet, 2005, “The evidential status of philosophical intuition”, Philosophical Studies, 121(3): 193–224.

Miščević, Nenad, 2004, “The Explainability of Intuitions”, Dialectica, 58(1): 43–70.

Wright, Crispin, 2004, “Intuition, Entitlement and the Epistemology of Logical Laws”, Dialectica, 58(1): 155–175.

Note on the side: Properties (kinds and attributes) are instantiated.

How do you support the truth of

<>(~G) is "possibly, God is not instantiated."    (possibly it is not the case that maximal greatness is coexemplified)  ?

[cnearing]

That large volumes of philosophy have been developed on the basis of it does not indicate that it or those volumes have any actual value, meaning, or relevance to reality.

<>(~G) is intuitively obvious

Seriously, I don't care.  This entire field is defunct as an epistemic venture.  I am not interested in prosecuting the reverse MOA as though it offered some serious means of getting at truth or knowledge.  It doesn't.  Just like the MOA doesn't.

I offer it just as a mirror.  Anything you can offer in support of p2 of the MOA I can mirror in support of p2 of the RMOA.

[ParaclitosLogos]

That large volumes of philosophy have been developed on the basis of it does not indicate that it or those volumes have any actual value, meaning, or relevance to reality.

<>(~G) is intuitively obvious

Seriously, I don't care.  This entire field is defunct as an epistemic venture.  I am not interested in prosecuting the reverse MOA as though it offered some serious means of getting at truth or knowledge.  It doesn't.  Just like the MOA doesn't.

I offer it just as a mirror.  Anything you can offer in support of p2 of the MOA I can mirror in support of p2 of the RMOA.

<<That large volumes of philosophy have been developed on the basis of it does not indicate that it or those volumes have any actual value, meaning, or relevance to reality.>>

With all due respect, It gives much more powerful evidence that  it does have value, meaning and relevance that your negation that it does not gives against.


<<Seriously, I don't care.  This entire field is defunct as an epistemic venture.  I am not interested in prosecuting the reverse MOA as though it offered some serious means of getting at truth or knowledge.>>

And your answer is still "No".

Thanks for the exhcange then.

[cnearing]

<<With all due respect, It gives much more powerful evidence that  it does have value, meaning and relevance that your negation that it does not gives against.>>

I completely disagree.  I don't think this true for any functional notion of evidence.

<<<And your answer is still "No".>>>

My answer to *what* is still no?

[ParaclitosLogos]

<<With all due respect, It gives much more powerful evidence that  it does have value, meaning and relevance that your negation that it does not gives against.>>

I completely disagree.  I don't think this true for any functional notion of evidence.

<<<And your answer is still "No".>>>

My answer to *what* is still no?

You are simply asserting, giving your personal opinions (you even say that you don´t care and merely declare the field defunct, that´s not really a real objection to any of it), with out any support from the literature, with out any real argument or support for your premises:  that Modal epistemoloy has no value, while asserting that ~G is intuitively obvious (which is contradictory) , that this or that.

Modal epistemology is a well on its way area of epistmology research, and, intuition at its core is argued to be evidence, and this is rather unproblematic, rather the question at times is how, when, in which way it is evidence not if it is evidence.

[aleph naught]

I think it is nonsense to say that two things can be semantically equivalent and mean two very different things.  Clark Kent and Super Man are either semantically equivalent or they mean different things.  Not both, and what matters is precisely what is meant by both.

You've got some weird intuitions, then. I think it's a thousand fold more nonsensical to claim that two terms can mean the same thing even though competent English speakers would so routinely fail to recognize it. If you're right then "Clark Kent is Super Man" is a trivial truth. But that's a pretty crazy thing to claim. Much crazier than supposing that two terms can have different meanings while referring to the same thing.

[cnearing]

<<With all due respect, It gives much more powerful evidence that  it does have value, meaning and relevance that your negation that it does not gives against.>>

I completely disagree.  I don't think this true for any functional notion of evidence.

<<<And your answer is still "No".>>>

My answer to *what* is still no?

You are simply asserting, giving your personal opinions (you even say that you don´t care and merely declare the field defunct, that´s not really a real objection to any of it), with out any support from the literature, with out any real argument or support for your premises:  that Modal epistemoloy has no value, while asserting that ~G is intuitively obvious (which is contradictory) , that this or that.

Modal epistemology is a well on its way area of epistmology research, and, intuition at its core is argued to be evidence, and this is rather unproblematic, rather the question at times is how, when, in which way it is evidence not if it is evidence.

In this mode of dialogue, I am simply following your lead.  This has not yet risen above the level of you asserting one thing and me asserting another, expect in the OP where I actually take the time to prove my point.

The fact is that you have yet to raise any actual objection to my argument at all, other than just offering some contrary opinions.

Why should I respond to that with anything besides my own opinions?

[cnearing]

I think it is nonsense to say that two things can be semantically equivalent and mean two very different things.  Clark Kent and Super Man are either semantically equivalent or they mean different things.  Not both, and what matters is precisely what is meant by both.

You've got some weird intuitions, then. I think it's a thousand fold more nonsensical to claim that two terms can mean the same thing even though competent English speakers would so routinely fail to recognize it. If you're right then "Clark Kent is Super Man" is a trivial truth. But that's a pretty crazy thing to claim. Much crazier than supposing that two terms can have different meanings while referring to the same thing.

"Clark Kent is Superman," is a trivial truth. 

Meanwhile, I don't object to using two different terms with different meanings to refer to the same thing.  However, if two different concepts directly entail one another, they are not different, and they do not have different meanings.