Have you ever met a person that embraced determinism as true?

[Emuse]

You weren't specific, that's not my fault. Darth Vader does exist. He is a character in the Star Wars series. If you thought he was something else that's just not my fault or problem. So yeah, I believe in Darth Vader, in the context of Star Wars, ever since 1977.
Trying to establish him as something else isn't my fail.

In my argument "believe in Darth Vader" means "believe that the character in the Star Wars films is also instantiated in external reality" for clarification.

So noted....Doesn't save your argument though....

I've also noted the problem in my first argument to Richard.  Please see modification to original post quoted in your initial reply.

Why don't you just use the much better, centuries old arguments for it and against it? You're not improving upon them, at all. You going to lay out a better argument than David Hume? Dream on.

I'm not trying to be better than anyone. I want to think it through for myself and see where I end up.  One way to do that is to present an argument and see why it fails or not.  In that regard, having an argument pulled apart by sound refutations is just as beneficial as an argument succeeding if not moreso.

At the moment there have been no sound refutations to the argument I presented.  If someone cant give a sound reason why my argument fails (even if it does) then shall I conclude that they are obviously in no position to critique Hume either.

In order to do this I steer away from mocking and name calling too. Something that a number of folk on the site struggle with.

[RichardChad]

At the moment there have been no sound refutations to the argument I presented.  If someone cant give a sound reason why my argument fails (even if it does) then shall I conclude that they are obviously in no position to critique Hume either.

see http://www.reasonablefaith.org/forums/choose-your-own-topic/emuses-argument-against-lfw-6033738.0.html

[pat1911]

You're seriously going to pretend that you didn't understand what Emuse meant when he talked about "believing Darth Vadar is real"?  You are really going to try and bluff that. Any credibility you once had has gone. You knew what he meant. Don't pretend.

Hey, I am not the one trying to reinvent the argument for determinism, which has been around for centuries using Darth Vader. You don't get to judge my credibility. He made a poor argument and I poked a hole in it. You can make better arguments or you can freely choose to ignore me. You are not determined to respond. It's not my fault you lot haven't properly researched the arguments before pull ad hoc ones out of thin air.

You didn't poke a hole in it. You evaded it by using an uncharitable and irrelevant interpretation of what Emuse meant. You still haven't responded to the argument as it was intended.

I did in fact respond to the argument, premise by premise. And thus illustrated that the argument was fallacious from premise 1. If you missed it you can go back and read it if you wish, or not, I don't really care. If you feel so inclined you can try to defend the premises of his argument.

And you still pretending that you believe that Vadar is real. Because he was a real character in a story. Fine. Go tell your friends you believe in Allah. He's a real character in a story too.

Well according to what you believe, I don't have a choice. I was determined to be insufferable. Darth Vader does exist. He just exists in a story. You are getting your ontology all twisted in a knot over something that does not even matter.
Your response simply tells me that you do not believe in what you say you believe. You are trying to change my thinking as if I had the free choice to do so. Under determinism I have no control over what I believe or think. I am just a pawn on someone else's chess board. Or perhaps this entire exchange was predetermined as well as you anger and vitriol against me because I won't play with the Darth Vader doll.

And Allah is just the Arabic name for God. So yes I do believe in Allah. If I were Arabic and went to an Arabic Catholic Church I would be singing my praises to Allah. So yes, I believe in Allah, i.e. God. 

[LADZDAZL]

You're seriously going to pretend that you didn't understand what Emuse meant when he talked about "believing Darth Vadar is real"?  You are really going to try and bluff that. Any credibility you once had has gone. You knew what he meant. Don't pretend.

Hey, I am not the one trying to reinvent the argument for determinism, which has been around for centuries using Darth Vader. You don't get to judge my credibility. He made a poor argument and I poked a hole in it. You can make better arguments or you can freely choose to ignore me. You are not determined to respond. It's not my fault you lot haven't properly researched the arguments before pull ad hoc ones out of thin air.

You didn't poke a hole in it. You evaded it by using an uncharitable and irrelevant interpretation of what Emuse meant. You still haven't responded to the argument as it was intended.

I did in fact respond to the argument, premise by premise. And thus illustrated that the argument was fallacious from premise 1. If you missed it you can go back and read it if you wish, or not, I don't really care. If you feel so inclined you can try to defend the premises of his argument.

And you still pretending that you believe that Vadar is real. Because he was a real character in a story. Fine. Go tell your friends you believe in Allah. He's a real character in a story too.

Well according to what you believe, I don't have a choice. I was determined to be insufferable. Darth Vader does exist. He just exists in a story. You are getting your ontology all twisted in a knot over something that does not even matter.
Your response simply tells me that you do not believe in what you say you believe. You are trying to change my thinking as if I had the free choice to do so. Under determinism I have no control over what I believe or think. I am just a pawn on someone else's chess board. Or perhaps this entire exchange was predetermined as well as you anger and vitriol against me because I won't play with the Darth Vader doll.

And Allah is just the Arabic name for God. So yes I do believe in Allah. If I were Arabic and went to an Arabic Catholic Church I would be singing my praises to Allah. So yes, I believe in Allah, i.e. God.

So you believe in Allah as well as Darth Vadar. Great. Not many interactions on this forum have such interesting results.

[pat1911]

At the moment there have been no sound refutations to the argument I presented.  If someone cant give a sound reason why my argument fails (even if it does) then shall I conclude that they are obviously in no position to critique Hume either.

see http://www.reasonablefaith.org/forums/choose-your-own-topic/emuses-argument-against-lfw-6033738.0.html

Well I suppose the unstoppable force of pride meets the immovable object of fallaciousness.   Lot's of people have torn apart your argument. It fails at premise 1.

"P1.  If determinism is false then LFW is true."
This is a false premise. Determinism being false does not necessitate that LFW is true. Determinism being false simply means that other things, such as freewill, or perhaps even libertarian free will is possible not de facto truth. Or even that determinism and LFW can both be true depending on which kind of determinism you are espousing; soft or hard or causal or necessary. Or both can be false. Determinism and LFW can both be false. Your undetermined version of determinism being false does not make a very specific kind of freewill, the libertarian freewill to be true.
For instance, the deterministic nature of abstract objects can exist, while agent freewill can also exist. Or the deterministic nature or abstract objects and agent freewill can both be false. The nature of abstract objects can be the result of the will of a larger mind that freely deems how each thing acts ad hoc, while at the same time agents can freely will, but unable to act.
In other words, under the umbrella of freewill vs. determinism their are many layers yet unexplored. Somethings can be determined and agents have freewill. Or all things can be result of freewill, or all things can be predetermined. There are many layers to the onion of determinism vs. freewill, you have barely scratched the surface. What is for certain is that 'if determinism is false' other things are possible. LFW is not necessarily true if determinism is false.
So in short, your horse never leaves the gate. Your argument fails at premise 1. And because premise 1 fails the whole argument is invalid. We don't even have to get to Darth Vader, he doesn't even get to put on his costume.

[pat1911]

So you believe in Allah as well as Darth Vadar. Great. Not many interactions on this forum have such interesting results.

No, not Darth VadAR, Darth Vader. He brought balance to the force.
Allah is simply 'God' in Arabic. I believe in Deus, Pan Buh, Dios, Theos, YHWH, etc. You pick the language and what ever the word for God is, I believe in that because I am a Theist. I believe in God.

[hatsoff]

"Free" in the sense that Richard is using it is "free to be acted upon".  His whole question is, "Why do you act as if I could believe otherwise?"  That is why I have focussed on beliefs.  The suggestion from him is that if determinism is true then there is no reason to think that he could have believed otherwise.  This is false if determinism doesn't entail modal collapse because if hearing an argument changes the antecedent consequences in which a belief is formed then the belief formed on hearing the argument can be determined whilst not being held necessarily if the argument could have not been presented (had he not heard the argument, his beliefs would be different).

First of all, even if you have interpreted Richard correctly---and I don't think you have---you still haven't shown that LFW (in the sense of freedom to act upon our wills) is false.  The Darth Vader example only goes to show that we do not have complete freedom to act out our wills.  However, we could still have limited freedom.  That's why I mentioned before that just because some of our willings are free doesn't mean that all of our willings are free.  For instance, even though we cannot freely believe in Darth Vader, we might still, say, freely catch a baseball thrown in our direction.

But, I have never heard of anyone, when discussing LFW, requiring freedom of action.

Second, even if we decide that LFW is false, this does not imply that determinism is true.  LFW, as I understand it, is the conjunction of two component theses:  (i)  free will is incompatible with determinism; and (ii) some agents really do have free will.  As a consequence, LFW implies that determinism is false.  However the converse does not follow from this---that is, it does not follow that

(1)  if determinism is false then LFW is true.

Now, you have argued that Richard should accept (1) because he accepts LFW.  But if you give him a defeater for LFW---as you aim to do---then you will undercut that line of support for (1).  This means you need an independent line of support for (1), to make your argument work.  But, I do not see how this is possible.

[LADZDAZL]

At the moment there have been no sound refutations to the argument I presented.  If someone cant give a sound reason why my argument fails (even if it does) then shall I conclude that they are obviously in no position to critique Hume either.

see http://www.reasonablefaith.org/forums/choose-your-own-topic/emuses-argument-against-lfw-6033738.0.html

Well I suppose the unstoppable force of pride meets the immovable object of fallaciousness.   Lot's of people have torn apart your argument. It fails at premise 1.

"P1.  If determinism is false then LFW is true."
This is a false premise. Determinism being false does not necessitate that LFW is true. Determinism being false simply means that other things, such as freewill, or perhaps even libertarian free will is possible not de facto truth. Or even that determinism and LFW can both be true depending on which kind of determinism you are espousing; soft or hard or causal or necessary. Or both can be false. Determinism and LFW can both be false. Your undetermined version of determinism being false does not make a very specific kind of freewill, the libertarian freewill to be true.
For instance, the deterministic nature of abstract objects can exist, while agent freewill can also exist. Or the deterministic nature or abstract objects and agent freewill can both be false. The nature of abstract objects can be the result of the will of a larger mind that freely deems how each thing acts ad hoc, while at the same time agents can freely will, but unable to act.
In other words, under the umbrella of freewill vs. determinism their are many layers yet unexplored. Somethings can be determined and agents have freewill. Or all things can be result of freewill, or all things can be predetermined. There are many layers to the onion of determinism vs. freewill, you have barely scratched the surface. What is for certain is that 'if determinism is false' other things are possible. LFW is not necessarily true if determinism is false.
So in short, your horse never leaves the gate. Your argument fails at premise 1. And because premise 1 fails the whole argument is invalid. We don't even have to get to Darth Vader, he doesn't even get to put on his costume.

You say that determinism and LFW can both be false. What other options are there?

This is the question theists ask atheists when running their arguments. In the FTA we are asked to consider 3 options: necessity (A), chance (B) and design (C). The argument then says "no reason to believe A, B seems improbable, therefore C.  I read Emuse to be doing a similar thing.  "Either determinism or LFW", "LFW seems inconsistent with what we know", "Therefore determinism".

Richard doesn't believe this is an argument for determinism and calls it a red herring. If so then the FTA isn't an argument for design and is a red herring also. Why the double standard?

[LADZDAZL]

"Free" in the sense that Richard is using it is "free to be acted upon".  His whole question is, "Why do you act as if I could believe otherwise?"  That is why I have focussed on beliefs.  The suggestion from him is that if determinism is true then there is no reason to think that he could have believed otherwise.  This is false if determinism doesn't entail modal collapse because if hearing an argument changes the antecedent consequences in which a belief is formed then the belief formed on hearing the argument can be determined whilst not being held necessarily if the argument could have not been presented (had he not heard the argument, his beliefs would be different).

First of all, even if you have interpreted Richard correctly---and I don't think you have---you still haven't shown that LFW (in the sense of freedom to act upon our wills) is false.  The Darth Vader example only goes to show that we do not have complete freedom to act out our wills.  However, we could still have limited freedom.  That's why I mentioned before that just because some of our willings are free doesn't mean that all of our willings are free.  For instance, even though we cannot freely believe in Darth Vader, we might still, say, freely catch a baseball thrown in our direction.

But, I have never heard of anyone, when discussing LFW, requiring freedom of action.

Second, even if we decide that LFW is false, this does not imply that determinism is true.  LFW, as I understand it, is the conjunction of two component theses:  (i)  free will is incompatible with determinism; and (ii) some agents really do have free will.  As a consequence, LFW implies that determinism is false.  However the converse does not follow from this---that is, it does not follow that

(1)  if determinism is false then LFW is true.

Now, you have argued that Richard should accept (1) because he accepts LFW.  But if you give him a defeater for LFW---as you aim to do---then you will undercut that line of support for (1).  This means you need an independent line of support for (1), to make your argument work.  But, I do not see how this is possible.

Hi hatsoff,

I think the distinction between will and belief has merit. But can't the argument be easily finessed to account for this?  I can give you salt to eat and your will to drink water afterwards is determined, you can't choose not to feel thirsty.  We can produce innumerable examples where people's beliefs and wills, and desires are determined. Multiple examples of cognitive biases and subliminal messaging when what we feel as our free choice is demonstrably no such thing.  There are some wills, beliefs and desires where it isn't so clear, or it hasn't been shown yet. But so what?  We have no clear examples of LFW in action. No example which can only be explained by LFW. And as Emuse says we don't need to show that every human has died before concluding that humans are mortal.

[hatsoff]

I think the distinction between will and belief has merit. But can't the argument be easily finessed to account for this?  I can give you salt to eat and your will to drink water afterwards is determined, you can't choose not to feel thirsty.  We can produce innumerable examples where people's beliefs and wills, and desires are determined. Multiple examples of cognitive biases and subliminal messaging when what we feel as our free choice is demonstrably no such thing.  There are some wills, beliefs and desires where it isn't so clear, or it hasn't been shown yet. But so what?  We have no clear examples of LFW in action. No example which can only be explained by LFW. And as Emuse says we don't need to show that every human has died before concluding that humans are mortal.

That seems to me an entirely different argument rather than a "finessed" version of Emuse's argument.  You are, if I understand you correctly, appealing to induction.  In particular, you are saying:

We have identified lots of wills which are determined, and never identified an undetermined will. Inductively, it follows that *all* wills are determined.

I am not impressed by this argument.  Indeed, it reminds me of Craig's inductive argument for his first Kalam premise, whereby he argues that we have only ever identified caused beginnings, and never identified uncaused beginnings.  In fact, his argument is considerably stronger in a certain way, as we are far more often able to identify causes for beginnings than determinations for wills.

[RichardChad]

A. Absolutely stunning how many atheists show up on the thread when it got derailed from the OP (have you ever met a person that embraced determinism as true) to "can we attempt to shoot down the notion of LFW but retain all of the terminology and the ability to freely choose cause if we can do that theism is false but we still have LFW will, er.. I mean.. we have everything that LFW has, just not the title cause that's associated with theism.."

B. Emuse, you please address your "argument" on this thread
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/forums/choose-your-own-topic/emuses-argument-against-lfw-6033738.0.html

[hatsoff]

A. Absolutely stunning how many atheists show up on the thread when it got derailed from the OP (have you ever met a person that embraced determinism as true) to "can we attempt to shoot down the notion of LFW but retain all of the terminology and the ability to freely choose cause if we can do that theism is false but we still have LFW will, er.. I mean.. we have everything that LFW has, just not the title cause that's associated with theism.."

B. Emuse, you please address your "argument" on this thread
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/forums/choose-your-own-topic/emuses-argument-against-lfw-6033738.0.html

Your thread has not been derailed. We have all been discussing arguments for determinism, and only in that context have we discussed subarguments for the premise against lfw.

[RichardChad]

A. Absolutely stunning how many atheists show up on the thread when it got derailed from the OP (have you ever met a person that embraced determinism as true) to "can we attempt to shoot down the notion of LFW but retain all of the terminology and the ability to freely choose cause if we can do that theism is false but we still have LFW will, er.. I mean.. we have everything that LFW has, just not the title cause that's associated with theism.."

B. Emuse, you please address your "argument" on this thread
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/forums/choose-your-own-topic/emuses-argument-against-lfw-6033738.0.html

Your thread has not been derailed. We have all been discussing arguments for determinism, and only in that context have we discussed subarguments for the premise against lfw.

actually, no, what you've been doing is derailing the thread to discuss LFW even after three requests from myself to stop doing so.

[Emuse]

LADZ is thinking along the right lines.

For anything I believe, if there is a necessary relationship between my belief and the reasons and evidence for my belief then my belief is determined by the reasons and evidence.  If not then either my belief just randomly corresponds to the reasons and evidence (but might not do tomorrow) or I am believing freely in response to the arguments and evidence but could believe the negation despite the arguments and evidence.  The same would hold for things I don't believe (eg, the existence of Darth Vader).  Either the lack of evidence and reasons determines my lack of belief (there is a necessary relationship between the two) or I'm just lucky but things could change for no known reason or I could believe despise the lack of evidence.  If the latter then nothing prevents me from switching beliefs by definition.

[RichardChad]

LADZ is thinking along the right lines.

For anything I believe, if there is a necessary relationship between my belief and the reasons and evidence for my belief then my belief is determined by the reasons and evidence.  If not then either my belief just randomly corresponds to the reasons and evidence (but might not do tomorrow) or I am believing freely in response to the arguments and evidence but could believe the negation despite the arguments and evidence.  The same would hold for things I don't believe (eg, the existence of Darth Vader).  Either the lack of evidence and reasons determines my lack of belief (there is a necessary relationship between the two) or I'm just lucky but things could change for no known reason or I could believe despise the lack of evidence.  If the latter then nothing prevents me from switching beliefs by definition.

FOR THE FOURTH TIME

Please stop derailing the thread, and Emuse please address the refutation of your argument here:
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/forums/choose-your-own-topic/emuses-argument-against-lfw-6033738.0.html

I can only speculate as to why you've been avoiding dealing with the argument in thread like the plague..