Have you ever met a person that embraced determinism as true?

[bskeptic]

And "you can't do X for non volitional physical or psychological reasons" ("flap your arms and fly", "believe in Darth Vader") is exactly what determinism argues out from because the psychological and physical factors are part of the antecedent events which are determining the outcome.

Whether determinism is true, or whether LFW is true, you still can't flap your arms and fly! LFW doesn't claim you can do anything at all!

[wonderer]

Denying certain occasions where freewill does not exist does not debunk freewill in general. It takes only one single act of freewill to crumble the entire glass house of determinism. Determinism must prove all things are determined. Freewill requires only one event in which it occurs.
So under determinism all actuals and potentials must be covered as determined. Simply freely choosing between Coke and Pepsi, and having freely chosen one and having had the option to choose the other causes determinism to fall apart. To be a deterministic is difficult. The burden of proof is immense.

Ah, so theistic arguments are good if the person putting forth the argument considers the premises more plausible than their denial, but I need to conclusively prove to uncharitable listeners every detail of the entire history of the universe and beyond.

Sorry, but don't be silly.  I might equally say to you that until you can point to some event within a human brain/body which is not a matter of physics, determinism is established.

The fact is, the large majority of professional philosophers reject the existence of libertarian free will.  Your suggestion that demonstrating LFW to serious thinkers is a trivial matter is very much mistaken.

Further, the action or defense of determinism must necessarily assume freewill exists  which is both ironic and contradictory. For if all is determined, so is determined our belief in freewill.
That may very well be it's undoing. The action of convincing somebody of a position assumes they have the will to choose what to believe.

No Pat, it is not assuming LFW exists, to understand that physically causal processes can result in a person coming to have a different point of view than they previously had.  You are simply engaging in bad psychology/mind reading when you purport to know the thought processes of people with views much different than your own.

If we are determined to believe in freewill it's futile to make arguments to convince somebody who does not have a choice in their beliefs. The action is a contradiction in itself.
Does it not seem weird to try and convince somebody of something they had no choice but to believe in?

This seems like a theistic notion of determinism, along the lines of the Greek Fates having determined everything that would happen.  With respect to a modern scientific view of causality it is a straw man.

No, it doesn't seem weird to educate a person, who through no fault of their own, has a mistaken point of view.  It would seem more hopeless if people simply chose what they believed.  On a deterministic view, it is understandable why the weight of evidence can result in people's perspective changing.  (Even changing to believing something they would prefer not to believe.)

As an engineer, I am convinced of things I don't choose to believe, on a near daily basis.  And it is a good thing that I am, or the quality of my work would be pretty poor.

[Emuse]

And "you can't do X for non volitional physical or psychological reasons" ("flap your arms and fly", "believe in Darth Vader") is exactly what determinism argues out from because the psychological and physical factors are part of the antecedent events which are determining the outcome.

Whether determinism is true, or whether LFW is true, you still can't flap your arms and fly! LFW doesn't claim you can do anything at all!

This continues to focus on what is true in the actual world and ignore what is deemed to be possible across worlds.

For example, if a miracle working God exists who can give people the ability to walk on water, cause axe heads to float, stop the sun and so on then he could just as easily give you the ability to fly by flapping your arms.  It is just the case that he hasn't.  So if such a God exists, your inability to make such a choice in the actual world is down to an external, antecedent factor beyond your control which determines that you can't (God's failure to give you that ability in the actual world).

[hatsoff]

Emuse,

Freedom of will or choice is not the same as freedom of action or belief.  So, for instance, we can freely *will* to believe in Darth Vader, but not necessarily be able to carry out that will and actually believe in Darth Vader.

What does this actually mean?  I can't believe in Darth Vader so its not something I can choose to do!  Even if I want to believe in Darth Vader (or fly unaided), how is a want that can't be acted upon a realistic choice?  That type of will is impotent.  And if we end up denying PAPs with respect to action to hold onto the idea of free will then there is still a problem with Richard's defence thus far.  The type of free will being defended there is freedom we possess in relation to realistic choices that we can make (what shoes to wear, to let a ball fall to the floor or not when thrown at you and so on).

I guess I don't see the problem.  We can still have free will without being able to act out all of our wills.  And by the way---at the risk of further splintering the conversation---we can also have *some* but not all of our willings be free.

[Emuse]

Well, freely willed actions not being the antithesis of random action will have interesting consequences for Kalam.

This goes back to you saying:

P1.  If determinism is false then LFW is true.

And it doesn't seem to follow. Determinism may be false, and you could have a measure of randomness. But that's not the same as LFW being true.

If somebody believes that LFW entails possible counterfactuals in relation to intentional actions and they don't believe that intentional acts can be random then this only leaves them with P1.  That's all my argument needs to deal with. 

What is stopping you from forming the belief that there is a duck on your head within the next 24 hours?

[Emuse]

Emuse,

Freedom of will or choice is not the same as freedom of action or belief.  So, for instance, we can freely *will* to believe in Darth Vader, but not necessarily be able to carry out that will and actually believe in Darth Vader.

What does this actually mean?  I can't believe in Darth Vader so its not something I can choose to do!  Even if I want to believe in Darth Vader (or fly unaided), how is a want that can't be acted upon a realistic choice?  That type of will is impotent.  And if we end up denying PAPs with respect to action to hold onto the idea of free will then there is still a problem with Richard's defence thus far.  The type of free will being defended there is freedom we possess in relation to realistic choices that we can make (what shoes to wear, to let a ball fall to the floor or not when thrown at you and so on).

I guess I don't see the problem.  We can still have free will without being able to act out all of our wills.  And by the way---at the risk of further splintering the conversation---we can also have *some* but not all of our willings be free.

"Free" in the sense that Richard is using it is "free to be acted upon".  His whole question is, "Why do you act as if I could believe otherwise?"  That is why I have focussed on beliefs.  The suggestion from him is that if determinism is true then there is no reason to think that he could have believed otherwise.  This is false if determinism doesn't entail modal collapse because if hearing an argument changes the antecedent consequences in which a belief is formed then the belief formed on hearing the argument can be determined whilst not being held necessarily if the argument could have not been presented (had he not heard the argument, his beliefs would be different).

[RichardChad]

No Richard,

I'm not going to bother defending determinism to you, since you have demonstrated to me that you don't want to know that you are wrong about things.  I prefer to save my time and effort for people capable of admitting to being wrong, or who even want to know when they are wrong about things.  They learn much better.

ok, the search continues then for an atheist willing to defend a core component of their world view!

[RichardChad]

So you believe that ...

"Someone throws me a ball, I can catch it or drop it, this is an exercise of free will"


... constitutes a defence of libertarian free will?

Fascinating

If in fact you are capable of choosing to catch or drop the ball, and the result of either catching or dropping is a possible action that can be taken, then you have LFW.

You wont find any professional philosopher that disagrees with that statement.

If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise. If a person acts of her own free will, then she could have done otherwise.

Interestingly enough for you, Dennet uses that same basic argument (ducking or not ducking from a thrown brick) in discussing how we are determined.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=joCOWaaTj4A

Right.  So you are providing an example of a behavior which you believe is consistent with LFW.  And Dennet uses essentially the same scenario as a coherent example of determinism in action.

So you've managed to cite an action that is coherent with LFW or determinism.



And this is how you defend a belief in LFW?  By citing a behaviour consistent with LFW, determinsim or compatabilism?

Fascinating.

well, you didn't watch the video..

Dennet says we are determined to avoid the brick that it will happen, the future is fixed, not that it's a choice. Ergo, if we have a choice we aren't determined.

This is very, very, very basic stuff LAD.

[LADZDAZL]

Richard, why aren't you prepared to defend the LFW you claim to believe in?  I've never met a proponent of LFW who who actually acts as though it's true. Have you?  Why don't you choose to believe in Darth Vadar for 5 minutes as Emuse suggests.  It really is endlessly fascinating to watch you jump hoops, duck and weave, rather than accepting the consequences of what you say you believe.

1. Actually I DO continually defend LFW, you sure have a selective memory! But you know that and said it anyway.

2. Red herring, are you another of those atheists for which determinism is a core component of your belief system yet you refuse to endorse it?

No you don't defend LFW.

When challenged you just claim red herring.


You genuinely seem to believe that some of the greatest philosophical minds of all time, who do hold to determinism and compatabilism, are not just obviously wrong but also know they are wrong and are delusional.

Your bravado is inversely correlated with your expertise.  But your bombast does get response whilst lowering the level of debate. You are the Donald Trump of reasonable faith.

I do not see where a red herring is committed. If anything, the challenge of believing in Darth Vader for 5 minutes would be a red herring in that doing so would neither demonstrate freewill or determinism, it's just a diversionary tactic by application of a nonsensical challenge that demonstrates the ability to be silly.
Okay, so I have chosen to believe in Darth Vader for 2 seconds. And?

And your purpose of the ad hominem attack demonstrates what exactly? Was that a determined attack? Or was the insult prepared under the assumption that RC can change his mind?

Whether or not you believe in freewill or not, attacking and insulting functions under the assumption of freewill; otherwise what's the point? Arguing determinism as if a person has the freewill to change his mind is hilarious to me...

It is Richard who claims red herrings, not me.

Did you actually choose to believe in Darth Vadar ?  Are you telling me you did really, really believe in Darth Vadar for two seconds?

Not really, I believe in Darth Vader in general. He was a great, well developed character in the Star Wars series of which I still like the original trilogy to be the best. So I gave it much more than 2 seconds. Vader was a great bad guy, so I still believe in him. He brought balance to the force. What am I supposed to believe about the character that is different from the story?

And I did not see where Richard invoked a red herring, at all. What was his red herring, specifically?

You know that this is not what was meant by believing Darth Vadar is real. Evasion noted.

And RC accuses others of making red herring arguments.

[Moot]

no offense, but you are simply clueless on compatabalism, astonishingly so.

Compatabalists ARE determinist (you've yet to acknowledge that BTW, wonder why ; - )  )
Compatabalism is simply the position that determiism and free will are compatible, (free will suitably redefined)

Here's the first thing I wrote in this discussion:

"If I had to guess, I'd say that determinism is probably true". You see?

Of course I know what compatibalism is. Unlike you, I've actually read compatibalists... on the topic of compatibalism!

You seem to think that you have found something remarkable by realizing that compatibalists are determinists.

Technically, I don't think you need to be a determinist to be a compatibalist. You could just see determinism and free will as compatible even if you believe some indeterminism to be true.

there is NOTHING on this page that makes the claim that compatabalists acknowledge the ability to freely chose.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/

It's exactly opposite, foundational to the notion of compatabalists "free will" is the notion that "freedom in the expression freedom of will modifies a condition of action and not the agent’s will"

see for example
1. If a person acts of her own free will, then she could have done otherwise (A-C).
2. If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise than one actually does (D-E).
C. Therefore, if determinism is true, no one acts of her own free will (F).

Call this simplified argument the Classical Incompatibilist Argument. According to the argument, if determinism is true, no one has access to alternatives in the way required by the Garden of Forking Paths model of free will.[11]

I'm not going through the most basic arguments for compatibalism. You should know them. Especially if you're going to say that they're false with such confidence.

I have no idea why I kept posting so long in this discussion. I must have been in a weird mood yesterday. Time to stop. Thanks for the discussion Richard. Illuminating as always.

[RichardChad]

It most certainly is a red herring, as you well know.

It gives you exactly what you've requested.  A prima facie proof combining logic and evidence.

P1.  If determinism is false then LFW is true.
P2. If LFW is true then we are free to believe claims for which there is no evidence.
P3. If we are free to believe claims for which there is no evidence then I can believe that Darth Vader exists.
P4. I can't believe Darth Vader exists.
C. Therefore, we are not free to believe claims for which there is no evidence.
C1. Therefore, LFW is not true.
C2. Therefore, determinism is not false.

Three modus tollens incorporating a simple test that someone can carry out in the comfort of their own home (falsify P4).

So no, not a red herring.  Which premise do you disagree with and why?

I've also already touched on the tu quoque fallacy.

Tu quoque (/tuːˈkwoʊkwiː/;[1] Latin for, "you also") or the appeal to hypocrisy is an informal logical fallacy that intends to discredit the validity of the opponent's logical argument by asserting the opponent's failure to act consistently in accordance with its conclusion(s).

Please Google for more info.  Even if I do act as though determinism is false, this still doesn't discredit the argument above.

1. Red herring
2. P2 need not be true for LFW to exist and for determinism to be false
3. Atheists ALWAYS trot out examples like "well, you can't choose to put your hand in the fire, so LFW doesn't exist" haha! no, all that is required for LFW to exist is that I be able to choose between catching or dropping the ball.
4. I agree that not acting in a manner consistent with the belief doesn't imply the object of the belief is false, but it DOES prove you don't believe it.

I take it that you're not going to defend determinism? Always the same with atheists
God doesn't exist therefor physicalism
LFW doesn't exist therefor determinism

yet, you run screaming from any request to defend physicalism, determinism themselves, why?

[bskeptic]

If somebody believes that LFW entails possible counterfactuals in relation to intentional actions and they don't believe that intentional acts can be random then this only leaves them with P1.  That's all my argument needs to deal with. 

What is stopping you from forming the belief that there is a duck on your head within the next 24 hours?

Your argument just looks crazy to me.

[LADZDAZL]

So you believe that ...

"Someone throws me a ball, I can catch it or drop it, this is an exercise of free will"


... constitutes a defence of libertarian free will?

Fascinating

If in fact you are capable of choosing to catch or drop the ball, and the result of either catching or dropping is a possible action that can be taken, then you have LFW.

You wont find any professional philosopher that disagrees with that statement.

If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise. If a person acts of her own free will, then she could have done otherwise.

Interestingly enough for you, Dennet uses that same basic argument (ducking or not ducking from a thrown brick) in discussing how we are determined.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=joCOWaaTj4A

Right.  So you are providing an example of a behavior which you believe is consistent with LFW.  And Dennet uses essentially the same scenario as a coherent example of determinism in action.

So you've managed to cite an action that is coherent with LFW or determinism.



And this is how you defend a belief in LFW?  By citing a behaviour consistent with LFW, determinsim or compatabilism?

Fascinating.

well, you didn't watch the video..

Dennet says we are determined to avoid the brick that it will happen, the future is fixed, not that it's a choice. Ergo, if we have a choice we aren't determined.

This is very, very, very basic stuff LAD.

This is not an answer.

Citing a scenario equally consistent with LFW or determinism is not a defence of LFW.

Now that is basic.

[Emuse]

Denying certain occasions where freewill does not exist does not debunk freewill in general.

Allow me to introduce you to the fallacy of special pleading! )  Special pleading occurs when we attempt to exempt something from an accepted principle but cannot give a good reason for doing so.  When we make an observation (eg, a person dying) we will form a belief such as "People can die".  The more times we observe this, the more certain of our conviction we will become.  If we observe people dying and no exceptions then we are justified in holding to "All people die" sans an evidential defeater because that is the only course we can take that avoids special pleading (exempting someone for no good reason).   If we observe something regularly then we need more than logical possibility to provide a defeater.

It takes only one single act of freewill to crumble the entire glass house of determinism. Determinism must prove all things are determined. Freewill requires only one event in which it occurs.

Determinism no more needs to prove that all things are determined any more than we need to prove that all people die.  Whilst it is true that one person not dying would disprove "All people die", we do not need to demonstrate that all people die to hold onto the latter.  That is simply false.  And the same goes for those arguing for determinism. 
 

So under determinism all actuals and potentials must be covered as determined. Simply freely choosing between Coke and Pepsi, and having freely chosen one and having had the option to choose the other causes determinism to fall apart.

Of course it doesn't.  Why do you think that Coke companies invest in advertising, put a lot of effort into packaging and so on?  Are they all wasting their money because none of this has any impact on what humans will select?  It only has to be show that there is a easily identifiable defeater for "nothing is governing our choice" in most given instances.

Further, the action or defense of determinism must necessarily assume freewill exists  which is both ironic and contradictory. For if all is determined, so is determined our belief in freewill.

This commits the same fallacy that I highlighted in my response to Richard and others.

"P1. If LFW exists then my belief B could have been different" does not give you "P1. If my belief B could have been different then LFW exists" if determinism doesn't lead to modal collapse.  Presenting you with an argument (or advert or what not) influences antecedent circumstances and so might change what you believe.

That may very well be it's undoing. The action of convincing somebody of a position assumes they have the will to choose what to believe.

No, it doesn't.  The action of convincing someone provides that person with argument and information that they previously might not have possessed.  This changes their circumstances which may in turn change their beliefs.  If you lacked a belief in X at time T but then formed a belief in X after T and after hearing an argument A after T then we actually have strong evidence that hearing the argument A is a strong aspect of the antecedent circumstances that determined your belief in X.

If we are determined to believe in freewill it's futile to make arguments to convince somebody who does not have a choice in their beliefs. The action is a contradiction in itself.

Of course it doesn't.  If you heard an argument that changed your belief then we have strong evidence that the argument determined a change in your belief system.  If you could have failed to have heard the argument, then your belief could have been different but it doesn't mean that the belief you do have isn't determined.

Does it not seem weird to try and convince somebody of something they had no choice but to believe in?

No.

[Emuse]

If somebody believes that LFW entails possible counterfactuals in relation to intentional actions and they don't believe that intentional acts can be random then this only leaves them with P1.  That's all my argument needs to deal with. 

What is stopping you from forming the belief that there is a duck on your head within the next 24 hours?

Your argument just looks crazy to me.

If beliefs can form randomly and no for no reason, you cannot rule out that you will form a belief that you have a duck on your head (even if you don't).  Why must randomly formed beliefs correspond to reality?  I think most people agree that intentional beliefs are not random.