Where are you getting that from? Can you quote the work of a LFW philosopher?
I'd rather present an argument which shows I'm thinking than simply list quotes!
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We are dealing with Richard Chad's defence of free will. Richard's defence relies on PAPs (to whit, for P to have free will it must be possible that P could have acted differently). To quote Richard from above ...
You wont find any professional philosopher that disagrees with that statement.
If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise. If a person acts of her own free will, then she could have done otherwise.The problem here is that determinism does not lead to modal collapse so "could have done differently" is not a sufficient condition for free will even if it is a necessary one. As a result (and given that PAPs are necessary under LFW and accepting Richard's claim that no professional philosopher denies this) the entailment relation "If P acted freely then P could have acted differently" doesn't give us the reverse "If P could have acted differently then P was acting freely". Why? If the antecedent circumstances that forced P to do A at time T in the actual world are not metaphysically necessary and could have been different even if only slightly then P could have done something other than A at time T in the actual world even though determinism is true. This also means that the sentence immediately prior to Richard's bolded statement is false in a general sense. I certainly hope for all our sakes that there are professional philosophers who disagree with it!
To avoid this and maintain PAPs, it must be possible for a person to take different actions under exactly the same antecedent circumstances. This is what I was addressing in my first response to Richard after he said ...
no idea what your claiming, look, it's very simple: on determinism there is NO action that could have been different given the same antecedent conditions. That's the definition. The future is as fixed as the past.
In this statement, Richard obviously isn't claiming that under determinism, there is no action that could have been different given different antecedent conditions. That's obviously false. To give the type of free will being espoused here, we need different actions under the same conditions and which are controlled by nothing other than the will of the belief former.
How could one have come to a different decision if one was still deliberating at the time?
That's a very good question!
Now you're supposing that LFW allows you the freedom to change the past!
Oh, come on! If I say, "I wore the brown shoes but of course, I could have worn the black shoes instead" I'm not saying that I can go back in time and change the shoes I was wearing! I'm claiming nothing of the sort. To say that an action could have been different and under the same circumstances is not to say that we can go back and change it.
I think they could be random generated in a sense. Why not?
Well, freely willed actions not being the antithesis of random action will have interesting consequences for Kalam.
And "you can't do X for non volitional physical or psychological reasons" ("flap your arms and fly", "believe in Darth Vader") is exactly what determinism argues out from because the psychological and physical factors are part of the antecedent events which are determining the outcome.