Have you ever met a person that embraced determinism as true?

[RichardChad]

So, still no atheists coming forward? Aleph? Emuse? Identity Crisis? apophenia?

This is what you're basing your reality on, no vigorous defense??

If they aren't determinists, then why should they defend determinism?

As for myself, I am agnostic on the matter.  Determinism may be true, or it may not be.  But if I were to somehow discover that it is true, it would not change the way I behave.  You obviously think that it should change the way a person behaves, and this is the thesis which you have never adequately defended.

How is it possible to be an atheist and not be a materialist/physicalist/determinist?

That would be interesting for someone to explain : - )

Cue voluminous discussions on what "atheism" means, what "physicalism" means and what "determinism" means, and how they arent the same notion (which is true)
but
not one word on how its possible be an atheist and not be a materialist/physicalist/determinist (except for the "I see no reason..." ones, which aren't reasons.)

There are many such ways. For example, I am an atheist and subjective idealist. Others are dualists. Still others are physicalists who just don't accept determinism. Why do you ask?

How is it rational to be an atheist and a dualist? What is the duality?
How is it rational to be a physicalist who does't accept determinism? What (besides quantum indeterminism which does not grant free will in any sense) is there that could possibly avoid determinism?


as a subjective idealist, do you think you are interacting with other minds?

[apophenia]

You haven't demonstrated that the language of deliberation, choice, and will is the province of LFW.  Until you do, your challenge is premature.  Get cracking!

hunh?
choice is the opposite of determination, you can't rationally argue that.

I think we've found the problem.  You're unreasonable. 

I use the language of determinism and so do you!  You speak of being influenced by desires and reasons and beliefs, of inspecting options (deliberating), of having a character which determines your predispositions, and of being a slave to sin.  That's the language of determinism.

what??
influence and determine are entirely different things, clearly this can not be argued.

influence
1.
the capacity to have an effect on the character, development, or behavior of someone or something, or the effect itself.

determine
1.
cause (something) to occur in a particular way; be the decisive factor in.

--

Seem pretty similar to me.  Maybe the problem is your dictionary.

  It's also the language of LFW, as free will doesn't actually enter into the question of resolving uncertainty in favor of certain outcomes, except as a fanciful reduction which nobody seems capable of specifying.  You have free will, it just doesn't affect your decisions.  Ah, gotcha.

what?
The ability to freely choose is a well understood notion, it's the opposite of being determined (again, this is pretty basic stuff, see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/

What provides for that ability to choose is the immaterial soul.

Right.  And the immaterial soul is a well understood notion. 

That our actions are sensible to ourselves is the greatest testimony to determinism that there is.  Otherwise I should be continually amazed that there is any sense to my decisions at all.

On determinism EVERY thought and action is determined, including the thought that actions are sensible. Your drifting into talking as if you have the ability to freely choose..

It's what those thoughts that actions are determined by which determines whether they appear sensible or not.  If I was just 'determined' to think certain things sensible and others not, my behavior would be wholly inexplicable to others.  It's the fact that others can tell a causal story about the reasons and beliefs I have, and how those determine my actions which provides the common foundation for understanding another person's actions.  If people just have different souls, possessed of different wills, why do we look for the proximal causes of someone's behavior at all?   The vicissitudes of your free will were determined at ensoulment, a process that I am completely oblivious to -- why should your actions make any sense to me at all?

You keep declaring words as off-limits to the determinist that aren't in fact outside the scope of a deterministic understanding of human behavior.  As long as this conversation revolves around a he said, she said view of the semantics, it's going nowhere fast.

[RichardChad]

You haven't demonstrated that the language of deliberation, choice, and will is the province of LFW.  Until you do, your challenge is premature.  Get cracking!

hunh?
choice is the opposite of determination, you can't rationally argue that.

I think we've found the problem.  You're unreasonable. 

well then, please explain how choice is not the opposite of determination.

note, on your professed world view, you and I are both doing exactly as physics determines us to, so value judgements like being "unreasonable" are pretty irrational.

Right? How is it possible to say someone is unreasonable if they could have done nothing else?

I use the language of determinism and so do you!  You speak of being influenced by desires and reasons and beliefs, of inspecting options (deliberating), of having a character which determines your predispositions, and of being a slave to sin.  That's the language of determinism.

what??
influence and determine are entirely different things, clearly this can not be argued.

influence
1. the capacity to have an effect on the character, development, or behavior of someone or something, or the effect itself.

determine
1. cause (something) to occur in a particular way; be the decisive factor in.

--

Seem pretty similar to me.  Maybe the problem is your dictionary.

1. similar is not the same
2. please re-read the definitions, in the context of determination we're talking about causing, not influencing.

  It's also the language of LFW, as free will doesn't actually enter into the question of resolving uncertainty in favor of certain outcomes, except as a fanciful reduction which nobody seems capable of specifying.  You have free will, it just doesn't affect your decisions.  Ah, gotcha.

what?
The ability to freely choose is a well understood notion, it's the opposite of being determined (again, this is pretty basic stuff, see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/

What provides for that ability to choose is the immaterial soul.

Right.  And the immaterial soul is a well understood notion. 

red herring

That our actions are sensible to ourselves is the greatest testimony to determinism that there is.  Otherwise I should be continually amazed that there is any sense to my decisions at all.

On determinism EVERY thought and action is determined, including the thought that actions are sensible. Your drifting into talking as if you have the ability to freely choose..

It's what those thoughts that actions are determined by which determines whether they appear sensible or not.  If I was just 'determined' to think certain things sensible and others not, my behavior would be wholly inexplicable to others.  It's the fact that others can tell a causal story about the reasons and beliefs I have, and how those determine my actions which provides the common foundation for understanding another person's actions.

you're clearly drifting away from determinism, on determinism everyone's thoughts and actions are determined. You and others are indeed determined to think the way you think. That's what determinism IS.

If people just have different souls, possessed of different wills, why do we look for the proximal causes of someone's behavior at all?   The vicissitudes of your free will were determined at ensoulment, a process that I am completely oblivious to -- why should your actions make any sense to me at all?

red herring

You keep declaring words as off-limits to the determinist that aren't in fact outside the scope of a deterministic understanding of human behavior.  As long as this conversation revolves around a he said, she said view of the semantics, it's going nowhere fast.

I'm not declaring anything off limits, I'm just accurately noting that so called determinists seemingly run from the notion at ever turn.

[hatsoff]

How is it rational to be an atheist and a dualist? What is the duality?

I think whenever people talk about dualism they are referring to material and mental stuff.  And, it is rational insofar as it seems intuitive (to some people), and there is no evidence to the contrary.

How is it rational to be a physicalist who does't accept determinism? What (besides quantum indeterminism which does not grant free will in any sense) is there that could possibly avoid determinism?

Well, first of all, you seem to acknowledge yourself that, on the quantum level at least, determinism is not evidently true.  So, that stops determinism in its tracks right there.  But on a macro level, one still need not accept determinism as there is simply no evidence to indicate that determinism is true.

as a subjective idealist, do you think you are interacting with other minds?

Of course.

[apophenia]

Without that language, what can you possibly discuss? Your answer to everything would necessarily be "well, you and I are just determined to believe what we believe".

That's nonsense and betrays a total misunderstanding of determinism.  Determinism doesn't mean that we are "just determined to believe what we believe."  Determinism acknowledges the role of deliberation and the uncertainty which faces each of us with every new encounter.

1. That's nonsense if you're claiming that deliberation can lead to doing something else. That is not what determinists believe.

Something else other than what?  You're missing a referent there.  If it's "other than what I might have done had I stopped deliberating earlier in my deliberations" then no determinism doesn't say that my deliberation could not lead to doing something else.  If you mean something other than this, you'll have to explain. 

2. "uncertainty which faces each of us with every new encounter" all that means is that one doesn't know what one is determined to think and believe, red herring.

It is not a red herring, it's the very crux of the matter.  Though my future may be ontologically fixed, it is not epistemically fixed from my vantage point at various points in time.  Thus the language of choice which is simply about fixing my point in time at which I will no longer deliberate.  It's perfectly deterministic.

That you feel the way you do is to me inexplicable.  But as a determinist, I fully believe there are reasons that have caused you to come to the position you have.  I don't accept that it's "just RichardChad's free will announcing itself with an arbitrary judgement."  You have reasons and beliefs about the matter, and if you didn't, then your behavior truly would be inexplicable.  Do you have reasons for your position which might cause another to adopt the same position as you or not?  If this insistence on the language of LFW is your way of communicating that you have no reason for believing as you do, just say so, and I will accept it.  It's just another "crazy" inexplicable choice made by a totally free will.

- equating LFW with arbitrariness is a red herring
- having the ability to deliberate and reach a decision when one could have decided to take a different action is possible only under LFW. That simply can not be argued.

Equating LFW with anything is a red herring as it's an incoherent concept.  You're saying that your reasons determine your decisions, actions, etcetera, but they don't determine your decisions, actions, etcetera.  And I'm the one with the red herring?

How could one have come to a different decision if one was still deliberating at the time?  Now you're supposing that LFW allows you the freedom to change the past!

[Friendly Banjo Atheist]

I do not feel in the least bit uncomfortable with determinism being true.  It makes zero difference in my life, that I am aware of.

On determinism, your future is equally as fixed as your past. It cannot be changed.

Every thought and action you will ever have, is fixed, determined, can't be changed.

Does that correspond with reality as you know it? Do you perceive that to be true? That you have no ability to do anything else?

. It could. Sure. I am comfortable with "Libertarian free will" being some confused notion  that our language has imprisoned us in.  I'm not saying it is, but maybe we will know in a few thousand years. 

[apophenia]

- equating LFW with arbitrariness is a red herring

René Descartes, for example, identifies the faculty of will with freedom of choice, “the ability to do or not do something” (Meditation IV), and even goes so far as to declare that “the will is by its nature so free that it can never be constrained” (Passions of the Soul, I, art. 41). In taking this strong polar position on the nature of will, Descartes is reflecting a tradition running through certain late Scholastics (most prominently, Suarez) back to John Duns Scotus.

[RichardChad]

How is it rational to be an atheist and a dualist? What is the duality?

I think whenever people talk about dualism they are referring to material and mental stuff.  And, it is rational insofar as it seems intuitive (to some people), and there is no evidence to the contrary.

on materialism all mental phenomena is identical with material interactions, so that can't be what they are talking about.

What are they talking about?

How is it rational to be a physicalist who does't accept determinism? What (besides quantum indeterminism which does not grant free will in any sense) is there that could possibly avoid determinism?

Well, first of all, you seem to acknowledge yourself that, on the quantum level at least, determinism is not evidently true.  So, that stops determinism in its tracks right there.  But on a macro level, one still need not accept determinism as there is simply no evidence to indicate that determinism is true.

1. quantum indeterminism never been shown to operate at the macro level
2. what's your argument that determinism is not true? Sans anything immaterial, it must be true.

[RichardChad]

Without that language, what can you possibly discuss? Your answer to everything would necessarily be "well, you and I are just determined to believe what we believe".

That's nonsense and betrays a total misunderstanding of determinism.  Determinism doesn't mean that we are "just determined to believe what we believe."  Determinism acknowledges the role of deliberation and the uncertainty which faces each of us with every new encounter.

1. That's nonsense if you're claiming that deliberation can lead to doing something else. That is not what determinists believe.

Something else other than what?  You're missing a referent there.  If it's "other than what I might have done had I stopped deliberating earlier in my deliberations" then no determinism doesn't say that my deliberation could not lead to doing something else.  If you mean something other than this, you'll have to explain. 

no idea what your claiming, look, it's very simple: on determinism there is NO action that could have been different given the same antecedent conditions. That's the definition. The future is as fixed as the past.

2. "uncertainty which faces each of us with every new encounter" all that means is that one doesn't know what one is determined to think and believe, red herring.

It is not a red herring, it's the very crux of the matter.  Though my future may be ontologically fixed, it is not epistemically fixed from my vantage point at various points in time.  Thus the language of choice which is simply about fixing my point in time at which I will no longer deliberate.  It's perfectly deterministic.

total red herring, the fact that you don't know what the fixed future is is irrelevant. It's fixed on determinism.
No determinist would claim the ability to do otherwise so terms like "deliberation" merely betray your belief in LFW. "decision" implies the ability to have chosen differently, which you claim you do not have.

deliberation careful consideration before decision.

That you feel the way you do is to me inexplicable.  But as a determinist, I fully believe there are reasons that have caused you to come to the position you have.  I don't accept that it's "just RichardChad's free will announcing itself with an arbitrary judgement."  You have reasons and beliefs about the matter, and if you didn't, then your behavior truly would be inexplicable.  Do you have reasons for your position which might cause another to adopt the same position as you or not?  If this insistence on the language of LFW is your way of communicating that you have no reason for believing as you do, just say so, and I will accept it.  It's just another "crazy" inexplicable choice made by a totally free will.

- equating LFW with arbitrariness is a red herring
- having the ability to deliberate and reach a decision when one could have decided to take a different action is possible only under LFW. That simply can not be argued.

Equating LFW with anything is a red herring as it's an incoherent concept.  You're saying that your reasons determine your decisions, actions, etcetera, but they don't determine your decisions, actions, etcetera.  And I'm the one with the red herring?

How could one have come to a different decision if one was still deliberating at the time?  Now you're supposing that LFW allows you the freedom to change the past!

red herring

[apophenia]

And we're back to where we began, with you over-extending the import of common words.

Both determinists and free will proponents agree that reasons, beliefs, and desires are somehow coupled with decisions.  It's just the determinist feels they are strongly coupled, whereas the LFW proponent doesn't want to accept that.  And so they imagine that they are only loosely coupled -- strongly enough to make sense of the narrative of reasons and beliefs, but not so strongly as to preclude acting freely.  They imagine a Goldilocks zone where the relationship between reasons and beliefs, and our actions is, "just right."  None of them can give any legs to where and how this Goldilocks zone exists, but it's a nice fantasy.

If our reasons and decisions are in fact loosely coupled, how did you determine that is the case apart from the possibility that they are strongly coupled?  The language doesn't give the game away because as we've seen, the language is compatible with them being strongly coupled.  I guess it must just be a 'feeling', that it doesn't feel like my reasons and my decisions are strongly coupled?  What is the substance of that feeling?  Or is it something else?

[Emuse]

no idea what your claiming, look, it's very simple: on determinism there is NO action that could have been different given the same antecedent conditions. That's the definition. The future is as fixed as the past.

These sorts of claims are testable.

Given LFW, there is a possible world in which you are in exactly the same circumstances that you are in now yet believe that Darth Vader is real (you've formed that belief, just to prove that you can freely do it).  If your view of LFW is correct then you are currently free to actualise that world in this one.  There is nothing about your present circumstances which prevents you from forming that belief, even if only to prove to yourself that you have LFW so defined.  You could believe in Darth Vader for say, five minutes and then abandon that belief again after the experiment.

Give at go!

[bskeptic]

no idea what your claiming, look, it's very simple: on determinism there is NO action that could have been different given the same antecedent conditions. That's the definition. The future is as fixed as the past.

These sorts of claims are testable.

Given LFW, there is a possible world in which you are in exactly the same circumstances that you are in now yet believe that Darth Vader is real (you've formed that belief, just to prove that you can freely do it).  If your view of LFW is correct then you are currently free to actualise that world in this one.  There is nothing about your present circumstances which prevents you from forming that belief, even if only to prove to yourself that you have LFW so defined.  You could believe in Darth Vader for say, five minutes and then abandon that belief again after the experiment.

Give at go!

What?

Atheists always tell us that you can't just "believe things without evidence". And on a certain level, that's correct. (When it comes to the atheism vs theism debate I think it's a little more complex than that, but that's not relevant here.)

LFW may well mean something like some choices are open to you; but not really anything random at all. You may well be able to have had something different for breakfast let's say; but you aren't going to pop next door to kill your neighbour, if that's completely against your formed character, or if you have no reason to do it and plenty of reason not to.

[bskeptic]

And we're back to where we began, with you over-extending the import of common words.

Both determinists and free will proponents agree that reasons, beliefs, and desires are somehow coupled with decisions.  It's just the determinist feels they are strongly coupled, whereas the LFW proponent doesn't want to accept that.  And so they imagine that they are only loosely coupled -- strongly enough to make sense of the narrative of reasons and beliefs, but not so strongly as to preclude acting freely.  They imagine a Goldilocks zone where the relationship between reasons and beliefs, and our actions is, "just right."  None of them can give any legs to where and how this Goldilocks zone exists, but it's a nice fantasy.

Well I can't prove it isn't determined, and you can't prove it is determined.

But there is nothing in our mental experience that requires determinism.

Things like ideas, emotions, desires, beliefs, and goals influence what we "will" to do. They can 'build up' in such a way so as to 'create' behaviour. But ideas and beliefs and goals etc., although they can build up in a logical-ish way to form our actions, do not seem to strictly compel the will. For one thing, we seem to play a part in setting our own goals and values. We aren't compelled by something if we can alter it.

[RichardChad]

And we're back to where we began, with you over-extending the import of common words.

Both determinists and free will proponents agree that reasons, beliefs, and desires are somehow coupled with decisions.  It's just the determinist feels they are strongly coupled, whereas the LFW proponent doesn't want to accept that.

nonsense, a determinist would never say such a thing as  "reasons, beliefs, and desires are somehow coupled with decisions", it's nonsensical on that view. Do you say "the planet made a decision to orbit the sun"
ridiculous.

"strongly coupled" is not the same thing as "caused": you continue to want to drift away from the position that determinists claim to be true.

Why? why aren't you enthusiastically endorsing your position? Why continue to try and make it look like LFW?

determinism: the doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes external to the will.

  And so they imagine that they are only loosely coupled -- strongly enough to make sense of the narrative of reasons and beliefs, but not so strongly as to preclude acting freely.  They imagine a Goldilocks zone where the relationship between reasons and beliefs, and our actions is, "just right."  None of them can give any legs to where and how this Goldilocks zone exists, but it's a nice fantasy.

If our reasons and decisions are in fact loosely coupled, how did you determine that is the case apart from the possibility that they are strongly coupled?  The language doesn't give the game away because as we've seen, the language is compatible with them being strongly coupled.  I guess it must just be a 'feeling', that it doesn't feel like my reasons and my decisions are strongly coupled?  What is the substance of that feeling?  Or is it something else?

red herring

[RichardChad]

no idea what your claiming, look, it's very simple: on determinism there is NO action that could have been different given the same antecedent conditions. That's the definition. The future is as fixed as the past.

These sorts of claims are testable.

Given LFW, there is a possible world in which you are in exactly the same circumstances that you are in now yet believe that Darth Vader is real (you've formed that belief, just to prove that you can freely do it).  If your view of LFW is correct then you are currently free to actualise that world in this one.  There is nothing about your present circumstances which prevents you from forming that belief, even if only to prove to yourself that you have LFW so defined.  You could believe in Darth Vader for say, five minutes and then abandon that belief again after the experiment.

Give at go!

red herring

How is it possible for you to be a determinist, yet absolutely refuse to provide your support for the position?

Why do you claim to hold the belief if you don't embrace it as true? It never occurred to you that "God isn't real therefor materialism/physicalism/determinism is true" is an incredibly poor argument?