Has Anyone Noticed Neopolitan's "Craig's Top Errors"?

[neopolitan]

LionIRC,

More fully, I wrote this:

This is akin to:

1.    Major Premise – If Trevor is a vampire (A) then Trevor will sleep during the day (B).
2.    Minor Premise – Trevor sleeps during the day (B).
3.    Conclusion – Therefore, Trevor is a vampire (A).

Thus those on the night shift get shafted, yet again. This is clearly a fallacy (irrespective of whether Trevor is a vampire) because the conclusion does not follow from the premises. Craig's framing of the argument this way has the reader feeling that it's wrong somehow, but unsure of how, where or why. The fact is, the argument is a null argument for God in that even if the opponent argues successfully for the non-existence of moral values and duties, that won't touch Craig's God since, in the strict framing of the argument, the existence of God isn't contingent on the existence of moral values and duties - only the reverse. The argument is framed purely to trick the opponent into conceding what looks like an acceptable premise (like the Major Premise in the fallacious version), then bludgeoning them into accepting at least a single objective moral value or duty to obtain a technical victory.

Please address the entirety of the argument in future.  I didn't make isolated assertions in the way that you imply.

The argument is fallacious when untwisted.  While still twisted, it still feels wrong (which is the correct way to feel, because it's fallacious) but working out why it's wrong is more difficult.  Surely you realise that the vampire argument is fallacious?  It's precisely the same form of argument as Craig uses, once the use of negation is removed.

I can twist it back up for you, if I must:

1.    Major Premise – If Trevor is not a vampire (not A) then Trevor will not sleep during the day (not B).
2.    Minor Premise – Trevor sleeps during the day (B).
3.    Conclusion – Therefore, Trevor is a vampire (A).

This screws with the mind due to the two nots.  Perhaps it doesn't screw with yours, but if you see that it is wrong, then you can see that the structure is the same as Craig uses, and the structure must be therefore be wrong.

I fixed the link.

[Philip Rand]

This screws with the mind due to the two nots.  Perhaps it doesn't screw with yours, but if you see that it is wrong, then you can see that the structure is the same as Craig uses, and the structure must be therefore be wrong.

.not.not.p = p

[keegclw]

At the bottom of each of his posts you see this

Craig's top errors:
Logic - Probabilities - Taxi-Cabs - Quotes - Historical Methods - Explanatory Evidence

Click on them for some heavy and scholarly criticism of WLC, including attacks on his intellectual honesty.

I would be interested to hear WLC defenders respond to Neo on these.  (EDIT: I am not endorsing an attack on WLC's dishonesty, nor defending WLC against such an attack here. I am simply drawing attention to Neo's blog posts about WLC and eager to see responses from WLC defenders.)

Hi, FBA

Is this "Neo.." person a poster at RF or a public figure?  Any links?

[Emuse]

I'm seconding Philip here (red letter day).  I see nothing wrong with the syllogistic structure of the moral argument.  It is ...

P1. ~G -> ~O
P2. ~~O
C. ~~G

P2 denies the consequent of P1 giving us a valid modus tollens which leads to denial of the antecedent of P1 at C. The double negation at P2 gives us O being true at P2 which gives us the double negation at C and G being true at C. 

[neopolitan]

I'm seconding Philip here (red letter day).  I see nothing wrong with the syllogistic stricture of the moral argument.  It is ...

P1. ~G -> ~O
P2. ~~O
C. ~~G

P2 denies the consequent of P2 giving us a valid modus tollens which leads to denial of the antecedent at C. The double negation at P2 gives us O being true at P2 which gives us the double negation at C and G being true at C.

This is evidence that it's the nots that are screwing with people's minds.  I draw people's attention to contraposition.

I also draw people's attention to When Morality Arguments Are Bad, in which I explain in more detail why this argument by Craig is fallacious.  Craig is trying to use agreement with G -> O to try to sneak past the claim that ~G -> ~O, but these are not equivalent statements.  If G -> O then ~O -> ~G.

For people looking at this argument as presented by someone else, I think confusion as to what it means is understandable.  For the person who formulated the argument, and deliberately inverted it, I think that confusion cannot be posited as an explanation.  It seems like intentional duplicity.

[Philip Rand]

No... neopolitan... you have got it completely wrong...

Fact is Craig is using an "If" statement with his double negative proprosition (making it hypothetical)... he would not use an "If" statement with the non-negation form of the proposition (making it non-hypothetical)...so his conclusion is pretty standard... and quite correct... It is the fact that it is a hypothetical proposition you are taking issue with NOT that it is a fallacy... because it isn't  AND it is not dishonest!!!

Emuse, is quite correct here... which really surprises me...he does know stuff after all (I have not been fair to him)

[Friendly Banjo Atheist]

At the bottom of each of his posts you see this

Craig's top errors:
Logic - Probabilities - Taxi-Cabs - Quotes - Historical Methods - Explanatory Evidence

Click on them for some heavy and scholarly criticism of WLC, including attacks on his intellectual honesty.

I would be interested to hear WLC defenders respond to Neo on these.  (EDIT: I am not endorsing an attack on WLC's dishonesty, nor defending WLC against such an attack here. I am simply drawing attention to Neo's blog posts about WLC and eager to see responses from WLC defenders.)

Hi, FBA

Is this "Neo.." person a poster at RF or a public figure?  Any links?

.

H Keeg. If we accept the existence of the external world, Neo is definitely a poster at RF :-)  Whether s/he is a public figure or not I do not know. I only know Neo from RFF.

[D. Alexander]

Trevor is not a vampire (A)

Trevor belongs to the class of non vampires.

            V   | ~ V
            0         1

Trevor will not sleep during the day (B)

Trevor belongs to the non sleeping during the day class.

             S   | ~ S
             0         1

Trevor sleeps during the day (~B)

Trevor belongs to the sleeping during the day class.

         ~ S   |   ~ ~ S
            0               1

Trevor is a vampire (~A)

Trevor belongs to the class of the not non vampires.

           ~ V   |   ~ ~ V
              0               1
—

What these little tables show is that ~ ~ S is sufficient for ~ ~ V and that ~ V is sufficient for ~ S.

The argument is formally valid, but the argument commits an illicit fallacy (when applied categorically) – failing to distribute either the major or minor term sufficiently – and can be demonstrated via:

The truth of: ~ { [ ( ~ V —> ~ S ) ] • [ ( ~ S — > V ) ] }

That is, the property of being a vampire is not distributed throughout the  non day sleep class hence; arguing that because P has the property of being a non day sleep class member that P is a vampire will be fallacious.

—

Craig's argument:

God does not exist (A)

God is absent in the class of the existing; God is a member of the non existing class.

Objective moral values and duties do not exist (B)

Objective moral values and duties are absent in the class of existing; Objective moral values and duties are members of the non existing class.

Objective moral values and duties exist (~B)

Objective moral values and duties are a member of the class of existing.

God exists (~A)

God is a member of the class of existing.

Broken down categorically:

(P) All objective moral values and duties existing and moral statements being true are God contingent (M)

(S) Rape is bad and “rape is wrong” is a moral statement (P)

(S) Rape is objectively bad and objectively wrong being true, is God contingent (M)

Rape is argued as bad and “rape is wrong” is argued to be true and it being true requires the subject in (M,) God, to exist.

Not a very good objection at all. Going to check out the others.

[neopolitan]

Objections to my objections will take two broad forms: claims that Craig's logic is actually correct as written (which is not being contested) and special pleading, as demonstrated by Coffin.

I don't think I need to do much more with Coffin other than point out that it is special pleading

.       if A-> B then ~B->~A except where A = G and B=O such that ~G -> ~O

I do note that Coffin knows enough about logic to construct truth tables, but not enough to know that -> (the poor man's →) means if ... then ... - it's truly bizarre to see, but I imagine that it's an example of the paradigm protection features in his world view kicking in.

At least Coffin supports my case that Craig's structure, including the hidden first step, is problematic.

[D. Alexander]

Pretty solid rhetoric right there and I'm on phone so I really can do the proper symbol, sorry.

But again the structure is valid in all respects; there's nothing in the conclusion that are beyond the premises; the conclusion follows from them and there's no illicit fallacies when put categorically.

You say it's special pleading that: if G, then O such that ~G implies ~O.

This however, seems confused.

In Craig's argument he argues that ~G implies ~O; necessarily implying that if O, then G and if G then O:

G  v  O     O • G
 1      0      0     0
0      1       0     0
 1      1       1      1
 0     0       0     0

Is the possible outcomes. Which is to say that necessarily, if G v O exists, then G • O exists. Which pretty much says God cannot not be what's constitutive of moral values and duties if God were to exist which is basically P1.

I really must be missing the mark here but if this is problematic then all other arguments that argue that p v q implies p • q  if p and q exist co-necessarily are all problematic. But that doesn't follow.

Take for example:

 (1) If two plus two equals four is not true, then there aren't any referents “two” and “four” existing platonically

(2) There are the referents “two” and “four” existing platonically

(C) Two plus two equaling four is true.

So:

M = the mathematical statement in question being true.

P = Platonism being true.


M  v  P    M • P
0      0     0     0
1      0     0     0
0      1     0     0
1       1     1      1

Whether or not the argument is sound is besides the point. There's no issue with it's formulation.

[D. Alexander]

...Why do you think everything that came into existence has a cause? Based upon what evidence?

Because a non-existent 'thing' bringing itself into existence doesn't parse.

Except for God, quantum fluctuations, and the universe apparently. That is - everything.

God?  Who here told you God came into existence?
LOL

I am familiar with the special pleading essential to the Kalam, yes - you exclude God from the rule applied. I just see it as a very weak response.

If you don't mind, can you please explain thouroghly how it's special pleading without giving a heavily tautological response? I'm struggling to wrap my head around the special pleading charge when God is excluded from the principle only because God doesn't fulfil the antecedent in the premise.

[Lion IRC]

Neo, you also asserted that the moral argument isn't specifically an argument for Gods existence.
What then IS it an argument for?

I would next like to bring up your blog about;
"The Method of WLC's Madness"

Specifically Occams Razor and how it applies critically AGAINST your (special pleading) statement;

"...The major problem with a god solution is that the god solution raises questions that are more difficult than those it answers.  That’s negative explanatory power."

The God conclusion answers the HOW and the WHY.

Your non-theist model effectively leaves our existential "WHY" questions unanswered.
(See Coyne, Dawkins, Krauss, Myers, etc. dismissing these with the wave of a hand.)

Now, I ask, which is the simpler, neater, more satisfying theory according to Occam? The  complicated one which has all those loose thread, unanswered questions dangling enigmatically, or the neatly bundled Unified Theory of Everything we call the God Conclusion?

I argue that atheism - not theism - which has all the unnecessary 'embranglements'. And that Occam would prefer the neater bundle with fewer loose threads.

[neopolitan]

Pretty solid rhetoric right there and I'm on phone so I really can do the proper symbol, sorry.

But again the structure is valid in all respects; there's nothing in the conclusion that are beyond the premises; the conclusion follows from them and there's no illicit fallacies when put categorically.

You say it's special pleading that: if G, then O such that ~G implies ~O.

This however, seems confused.

In Craig's argument he argues that ~G implies ~O; necessarily implying that if O, then G and if G then O:

G  v  O     O • G
 1      0      0     0
0      1       0     0
 1      1       1      1
 0     0       0     0

Is the possible outcomes. Which is to say that necessarily, if G v O exists, then G • O exists. Which pretty much says God cannot not be what's constitutive of moral values and duties if God were to exist which is basically P1.

I really must be missing the mark here but if this is problematic then all other arguments that argue that p v q implies p • q  if p and q exist co-necessarily are all problematic. But that doesn't follow.

Take for example:

 (1) If two plus two equals four is not true, then there aren't any referents “two” and “four” existing platonically

(2) There are the referents “two” and “four” existing platonically

(C) Two plus two equaling four is true.

So:

M = the mathematical statement in question being true.

P = Platonism being true.


M  v  P    M • P
0      0     0     0
1      0     0     0
0      1     0     0
1       1     1      1

Whether or not the argument is sound is besides the point. There's no issue with it's formulation.

I don't really need to argue against you in great length, Coffin.  Wikinauts have already collated the data that defeats you.

You'll probably argue, quite rightly, that Wikipedia is not necessarily authoritative and pretty much anybody can get on-line and write an article and/or amend it.  So I'd suggest you look at the article that it has been suggested that this one be merged with (because there are on-going discussions about the accuracy of all articles of any import on Wikipedia), scroll down to the bottom and seek out the references to see if the article accurately represents what is in the authoritative texts (specifically this one - search for the word "obversion").

You are left with nothing more than special pleading, no matter how many truth tables you throw at me.

[neopolitan]

Neo, you also asserted that the moral argument isn't specifically an argument for Gods existence.
What then IS it an argument for?

Can you point to the actual wording that you are paraphrasing here.  I didn't use those words so I'm not sure what you have, specifically, misunderstood.

I would next like to bring up your blog about;
"The Method of WLC's Madness"

Specifically Occams Razor and how it applies critically AGAINST your (special pleading) statement;

"...The major problem with a god solution is that the god solution raises questions that are more difficult than those it answers.  That’s negative explanatory power."

The God conclusion answers the HOW and the WHY.

Your non-theist model effectively leaves our existential "WHY" questions unanswered.
(See Coyne, Dawkins, Krauss, Myers, etc. dismissing these with the wave of a hand.)

Now, I ask, which is the simpler, neater, more satisfying theory according to Occam? The  complicated one which has all those loose thread, unanswered questions dangling enigmatically, or the neatly bundled Unified Theory of Everything we call the God Conclusion?

I argue that atheism - not theism - which has all the unnecessary 'embranglements'. And that Occam would prefer the neater bundle with fewer loose threads.

We agreed, did we not, to deal with one issue at a time.  I suggest that old this in abeyance until we've dealt with the morality argument "to death".  Note that the most sensible place to move from the morality argument in the The Logic of  an Apologist is to When Morality Arguments are Bad, since it's merely an expansion of the same topic.

[Lion IRC]

Neo, you also asserted that the moral argument isn't specifically an argument for Gods existence.
What then IS it an argument for?

Can you point to the actual wording that you are paraphrasing here.  I didn't use those words so I'm not sure what you have, specifically, misunderstood.

Sure.
You wrote;
"...The fact is, the argument is a null argument for God in that even if the opponent argues successfully for the non-existence of moral values and duties, that won't touch Craig's God"

If it's not an argument for God, what is it arguing for?

...We agreed, did we not, to deal with one issue at a time.  I suggest that old this in abeyance until we've dealt with the morality argument "to death"...

As you wish.