The Craig/Carroll Debate and the Death of the Kalam Cosmological Argument

[grosso]

Okay. So far, here is what it looks like you're arguing for:

1) True premises (independent of whether they are known to be true)
2) Valid reasoning (which together with 1 makes for a sound argument)
3) Plausible premises (which gives people epistemic warrant to believe)
4) "if the conjunction of the premises of an argument is more plausible than its negation, the conclusion of the argument should be plausible to believe."

What would you say (4) does above and beyond the other criteria?

What do you think I'm arguing for, exactly? I've been arguing the whole thread that you were wrong when you said that premises that are individually more plausible than their negations guaranteed the conclusion was plausible to believe. I think that the conjunction of the premises being more plausible than its negation is what guarantees the conclusion is plausible to believe.

I'm not offering an account of a "good argument" or whatever you think I'm arguing for with those four points. I'm merely offering an alternative to your account of when an argument has a conclusion that is plausible to believe.

You know, I'm still not seeing a clear picture of what you're arguing for.

Based on post #70 and #71, you seem to be saying that in addition to the three criteria Craig refers to, you want to invoke a fourth criteria. This is suggested by your response:

I'd say that if the conjunction of the premises of an argument is more plausible than its negation, the conclusion of the argument should be plausible to believe.

To my question of what additional criteria is necessary.

Can you take a step back and situate your claim in light of what has already been discussed? Particularly:

a) The criteria Craig referred to.
b) How your view understands and adjudicates the difference between the truth of the premises and their epistemic warrant.

[phidiasv]

Can you take a step back and situate your claim in light of what has already been discussed? Particularly:

a) The criteria Craig referred to.
b) How your view understands and adjudicates the difference between the truth of the premises and their epistemic warrant.

Okay.

Regarding (a): Craig says that a "good argument" is valid, the premises are true, and the premises are more plausible than their negations. I disagree with that; I think all arguments that meet these three criteria are "good", but also think that there are some good arguments that don't meet the criteria. But I'm not arguing against Craig's account of good arguments in this thread.

If I'm interpreting your posts correctly, I gather that you think that if an argument meets Craig's conditions for being a "good argument" (valid, true premises, premises more plausible than their negations) then the conclusion will always be plausible to believe. I disagree with *that*.

My position: If you've got (1) a valid argument, and (2) the conjunction of premises is more plausible than its negation, then the conclusion of that argument is plausible to believe. This is not an account of "good arguments", so is not in opposition to what Craig is saying. It is only a counter-position to yours.

Regarding (b): I don't know what you're asking for here.

[grosso]

Can you take a step back and situate your claim in light of what has already been discussed? Particularly:

a) The criteria Craig referred to.
b) How your view understands and adjudicates the difference between the truth of the premises and their epistemic warrant.

Okay.

Regarding (a): Craig says that a "good argument" is valid, the premises are true, and the premises are more plausible than their negations. I disagree with that; I think all arguments that meet these three criteria are "good", but also think that there are some good arguments that don't meet the criteria. But I'm not arguing against Craig's account of good arguments in this thread.

If I'm interpreting your posts correctly, I gather that you think that if an argument meets Craig's conditions for being a "good argument" (valid, true premises, premises more plausible than their negations) then the conclusion will always be plausible to believe. I disagree with *that*.

My position: If you've got (1) a valid argument, and (2) the conjunction of premises is more plausible than its negation, then the conclusion of that argument is plausible to believe. This is not an account of "good arguments", so is not in opposition to what Craig is saying. It is only a counter-position to yours.

Regarding (b): I don't know what you're asking for here.

Okay, this certainly helps. Thanks.

Given the third condition, I think it's illegitimate to combine the probability of the premises to determine the probability of the conclusion.

I don't know if the rules of inference map 1:1 with such a probabilistic approach. Particularly, I don't know if, in a deductive argument, the premises are meant to be additive.

[phidiasv]

Okay, this certainly helps. Thanks.

Given the third condition, I think it's illegitimate to combine the probability of the premises to determine the probability of the conclusion.

Well, I don't think that the probability/plausibility of the premises determine the probability/plausibility of the conclusion. I only think that the probability/plausibility of the premises establish a lower bound for the probability/plausibility of the conclusion. I think Craig agrees with me here.

I don't know if the rules of inference map 1:1 with such a probabilistic approach. Particularly, I don't know if, in a deductive argument, the premises are meant to be additive.

Consider the Kalam argument:
1) Everything that begins to exist has a cause. (Premise)
2) The universe began to exist. (Premise)
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.

Now consider the Kalam* argument:
4) Everything that begins to exist has a cause, and the universe began to exist. (Premise)
5) Everything that begins to exist has a cause. (From 4)
6) The universe began to exist. (From 4)
7) Therefore, the universe has a cause.

The Kalam* argument is very similar to the Kalam, but the Kalam* argument has only one premise. I think, and hope that you'll agree, that the Kalam and the Kalam* are equally good arguments, should be equally persuasive, and should equally affect how plausible one finds the conclusion. And since the only premise in the Kalam* is just the conjunction of the two premises of the Kalam, we can see that the plausibility of the conjunction of the two premises of the Kalam is what matters in assessing the plausibility of the conclusion.

[grosso]

Okay, this certainly helps. Thanks.

Given the third condition, I think it's illegitimate to combine the probability of the premises to determine the probability of the conclusion.

Well, I don't think that the probability/plausibility of the premises determine the probability/plausibility of the conclusion. I only think that the probability/plausibility of the premises establish a lower bound for the probability/plausibility of the conclusion. I think Craig agrees with me here.

I don't know if the rules of inference map 1:1 with such a probabilistic approach. Particularly, I don't know if, in a deductive argument, the premises are meant to be additive.

Consider the Kalam argument:
1) Everything that begins to exist has a cause. (Premise)
2) The universe began to exist. (Premise)
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.

Now consider the Kalam* argument:
4) Everything that begins to exist has a cause, and the universe began to exist. (Premise)
5) Everything that begins to exist has a cause. (From 4)
6) The universe began to exist. (From 4)
7) Therefore, the universe has a cause.

The Kalam* argument is very similar to the Kalam, but the Kalam* argument has only one premise. I think, and hope that you'll agree, that the Kalam and the Kalam* are equally good arguments, should be equally persuasive, and should equally affect how plausible one finds the conclusion. And since the only premise in the Kalam* is just the conjunction of the two premises of the Kalam, we can see that the plausibility of the conjunction of the two premises of the Kalam is what matters in assessing the plausibility of the conclusion.

Simply by virtue of the nature of your claim, I think it entails a far higher burden of proof than successful application to individual arguments (if it is indeed successful).

For the sort of criteria Mavrodes and Davis have in mind, I think your criteria has to be applicable to arguments in general, and be able to account for all varieties.

For that reason I think the task you're taking on is pretty big and requires a lot more work.

[phidiasv]

Okay, this certainly helps. Thanks.

Given the third condition, I think it's illegitimate to combine the probability of the premises to determine the probability of the conclusion.

Well, I don't think that the probability/plausibility of the premises determine the probability/plausibility of the conclusion. I only think that the probability/plausibility of the premises establish a lower bound for the probability/plausibility of the conclusion. I think Craig agrees with me here.

I don't know if the rules of inference map 1:1 with such a probabilistic approach. Particularly, I don't know if, in a deductive argument, the premises are meant to be additive.

Consider the Kalam argument:
1) Everything that begins to exist has a cause. (Premise)
2) The universe began to exist. (Premise)
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.

Now consider the Kalam* argument:
4) Everything that begins to exist has a cause, and the universe began to exist. (Premise)
5) Everything that begins to exist has a cause. (From 4)
6) The universe began to exist. (From 4)
7) Therefore, the universe has a cause.

The Kalam* argument is very similar to the Kalam, but the Kalam* argument has only one premise. I think, and hope that you'll agree, that the Kalam and the Kalam* are equally good arguments, should be equally persuasive, and should equally affect how plausible one finds the conclusion. And since the only premise in the Kalam* is just the conjunction of the two premises of the Kalam, we can see that the plausibility of the conjunction of the two premises of the Kalam is what matters in assessing the plausibility of the conclusion.

Simply by virtue of the nature of your claim, I think it entails a far higher burden of proof than successful application to individual arguments (if it is indeed successful).

For the sort of criteria Mavrodes and Davis have in mind, I think your criteria has to be applicable to arguments in general, and be able to account for all varieties.

For that reason I think the task you're taking on is pretty big and requires a lot more work.

Every argument can be reformulated as having a single conjunctive premise. An argument with four premises, A, B, C, and D, is equivalent to an argument with a single premise: A^B^C^D. So, in that fashion, it works for all deductive arguments.

[grosso]

Okay, this certainly helps. Thanks.

Given the third condition, I think it's illegitimate to combine the probability of the premises to determine the probability of the conclusion.

Well, I don't think that the probability/plausibility of the premises determine the probability/plausibility of the conclusion. I only think that the probability/plausibility of the premises establish a lower bound for the probability/plausibility of the conclusion. I think Craig agrees with me here.

I don't know if the rules of inference map 1:1 with such a probabilistic approach. Particularly, I don't know if, in a deductive argument, the premises are meant to be additive.

Consider the Kalam argument:
1) Everything that begins to exist has a cause. (Premise)
2) The universe began to exist. (Premise)
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.

Now consider the Kalam* argument:
4) Everything that begins to exist has a cause, and the universe began to exist. (Premise)
5) Everything that begins to exist has a cause. (From 4)
6) The universe began to exist. (From 4)
7) Therefore, the universe has a cause.

The Kalam* argument is very similar to the Kalam, but the Kalam* argument has only one premise. I think, and hope that you'll agree, that the Kalam and the Kalam* are equally good arguments, should be equally persuasive, and should equally affect how plausible one finds the conclusion. And since the only premise in the Kalam* is just the conjunction of the two premises of the Kalam, we can see that the plausibility of the conjunction of the two premises of the Kalam is what matters in assessing the plausibility of the conclusion.

Simply by virtue of the nature of your claim, I think it entails a far higher burden of proof than successful application to individual arguments (if it is indeed successful).

For the sort of criteria Mavrodes and Davis have in mind, I think your criteria has to be applicable to arguments in general, and be able to account for all varieties.

For that reason I think the task you're taking on is pretty big and requires a lot more work.

Every argument can be reformulated as having a single conjunctive premise. An argument with four premises, A, B, C, and D, is equivalent to an argument with a single premise: A^B^C^D. So, in that fashion, it works for all deductive arguments.

Okay. I find this interesting, but at this point I think it can only be useful if it takes into account the existing literature on arguments.

[phidiasv]

Okay. I find this interesting, but at this point I think it can only be useful if it takes into account the existing literature on arguments.

Well hey, we've got some mutual understanding, at least, and that ain't nothing.

As far as usefulness is concerned, I'm not sure it is really useful. I suppose I'm of the opinion that, when dealing with arguments where there may be significant doubts about the plausibility of the premises, an inductive/probabilistic form of argument is probably more useful than a deductive argument. But that's just me, maybe.

Cheers.