The Craig/Carroll Debate and the Death of the Kalam Cosmological Argument

[osmosis321]

You are being aggressive, for no reason.

If so, I apologize.

[OneCheesyNacho]

While it is not clear whether Carroll demonstrated that “God did not exist” (although, I think you could argue he demonstrated that there can be a universe where a God does not exist), he did destroy any utility for the Kalam Cosmological Argument (hereafter, “KCA.”)

KCA is a philosophical argument that Craig has championed now for decades.  While there are numerous twists and turns within it involving infinities and other issues, the argument in its basic form can be stated in three tight premises:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause;
2. The universe began to exist; and
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

While Carroll argued I think successfully that no one (especially Craig) knows whether premise two is correct, his real point - and the point that literally puts a steak in the hart of KCA - is that premise one is simply a meaningless statement in modern scientific cosmology.

In his post debate blog on this point he writes the following:

“My attitude toward the above two premises is that (2) is completely uncertain, while the “obvious” one (1) is flat-out false. Or not even false, as I put it, because the notion of a “cause” isn’t part of an appropriate vocabulary to use for discussing fundamental physics. Rather, modern physical models take the form of unbreakable patterns — laws of Nature — that persist without any external causes. The Aristotelian analysis of causes is outdated when it comes to modern fundamental physics; what matters is whether you can find a formal mathematical model that accounts for the data. . .”  (See http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/02/24/post-debate-reflections/, March 23, 2014.)

This is why KCA is dead; it is an anachronism.  It is like making a philosophical argument about why influenza is contagious.  No one is doing that because no one thinks about influenza in those terms.  The KCA as pointed out by Carroll is an Aristotelian argument in a discipline that no longer has need for such arguments.

I am an agnostic (maybe even leaning towards being a deist of some type), and I am honestly open minded about the existence of God.  But it became painfully clear in the Carroll/Craig debate that KCA is of no use to discover such an existence.  Its unfortunate, but it appears that in 50 years Craig’s papers and debates on this issue will be worth nothing more than as an amusing footnote about quaint little philosophers and their crazy ideas from the late 20th and early 21st centuries.

It actually all comes down to the A or B theory of time. Carrol takes a B theory while Craig takes the A theory of time to be true.

[steve hinrichs]

Physicist define time by atomic events such as an atomic clock that uses an electronic transition frequency in as a frequency standard for its timekeeping element.  So by this definition of time if there is no atoms or physical stuff for atomic activity, then there is no basis for defining this kind of time.  So when saying “When the stuff of the universe first existed is the first moment in time” is just a statement of this kind of time.  An argument achieved by just stating the definition is a Rhetoric Tautology.  Consequently, the statement conveys no useful information regardless of its length or complexity making it unfalsifiable. It is a way of formulating a description such that masquerades as an explanation when the real reason for the phenomena cannot be independently derived.

Tautology (rhetoric) ,  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tautology_%28rhetoric%29

This is just what Carroll did in the quote below.  He has formulated an unfalsifiable argument on which he can make the “popping into existence any physical stuff” sound not so implausible.  Since by this kind of time there is no atomic or energy events before the atomic or energy existed one can just we do not need to worry about how they came into existence because by this definition of time there is no time before they existed.

Carroll -  “Again, I tried to explain what makes the universe different but more importantly the phrase “popping into existence” is not the right one to use when you’re talking about the universe. It sounds as if it’s something that happens in time but that’s not the right way to do it because there’s no before the beginning, if there’s a beginning. The correct thing to say is there was a first moment of time.  When you say it that way it doesn’t’ sound so implausible.”

If there is something else besides physical stuff that caused the physical stuff to come into existence, then I do not see any reason why this non-natural something could have sequential events so a time could be defined by it’s sequential events and this time would be related to atomic time by the time when it caused the physical stuff to come into existence.

Hinrichs Webpage http://home.roadrunner.com/~rrr33/homepage.html

[Pieter]

Physics first, metaphysics second. 

Is this a metaphysical principle we should adopt or is it an assertion?

[dorel]

While it is not clear whether Carroll demonstrated that “God did not exist” (although, I think you could argue he demonstrated that there can be a universe where a God does not exist), he did destroy any utility for the Kalam Cosmological Argument (hereafter, “KCA.”)

KCA is a philosophical argument that Craig has championed now for decades.  While there are numerous twists and turns within it involving infinities and other issues, the argument in its basic form can be stated in three tight premises:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause;
2. The universe began to exist; and
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

While Carroll argued I think successfully that no one (especially Craig) knows whether premise two is correct, his real point - and the point that literally puts a steak in the hart of KCA - is that premise one is simply a meaningless statement in modern scientific cosmology.

In his post debate blog on this point he writes the following:

“My attitude toward the above two premises is that (2) is completely uncertain, while the “obvious” one (1) is flat-out false. Or not even false, as I put it, because the notion of a “cause” isn’t part of an appropriate vocabulary to use for discussing fundamental physics. Rather, modern physical models take the form of unbreakable patterns — laws of Nature — that persist without any external causes. The Aristotelian analysis of causes is outdated when it comes to modern fundamental physics; what matters is whether you can find a formal mathematical model that accounts for the data. . .”  (See http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/02/24/post-debate-reflections/, March 23, 2014.)

This is why KCA is dead; it is an anachronism.  It is like making a philosophical argument about why influenza is contagious.  No one is doing that because no one thinks about influenza in those terms.  The KCA as pointed out by Carroll is an Aristotelian argument in a discipline that no longer has need for such arguments.

I am an agnostic (maybe even leaning towards being a deist of some type), and I am honestly open minded about the existence of God.  But it became painfully clear in the Carroll/Craig debate that KCA is of no use to discover such an existence.  Its unfortunate, but it appears that in 50 years Craig’s papers and debates on this issue will be worth nothing more than as an amusing footnote about quaint little philosophers and their crazy ideas from the late 20th and early 21st centuries.

is a meaningless statement in a way as Carroll interpret what the universe is, and has a lot of meaning in a way how Craig interpret that the universe is.
actually don't talk about our universe.
he spoke about his model of a multiverse having no beginning, and in the debate accepted that inside this model our universe is just a baby-universe with a beginning.
the problem is that his multiverse exist just on paper, or in his mind.
by contrast our universe about what Craig talk is a real universe
this real universe in the light of the evidence is more likely that has a beginning.
if the universe has a beginning it needs a cause.

[demosthenes]

steve hinrichs said:

Physicist define time by atomic events such as an atomic clock that uses an electronic transition frequency in as a frequency standard for its timekeeping element.  So by this definition of time if there is no atoms or physical stuff for atomic activity, then there is no basis for defining this kind of time.  So when saying “When the stuff of the universe first existed is the first moment in time” is just a statement of this kind of time.

Is this not a straw man argument, followed by a non sequitor?
1) Physicist might define this beginning description as a way to measure time, but it does not follow that time is a product of atomic activity, this is your model.
2) Uttering “When the stuff of the universe first existed is the first moment in time”, one could have many different concepts of time in mind. It is only stated that there is a beginning time, not what the nature of time is. In particular this statement does not imply your straw man model.

[troyjs]

Empirical proof of the Peano axioms.

[doublehelix]

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause;

Defining a "cause" is more complex than that, because several factors could
be the cause. Many times, things have several causes.
We don't know if everything needs a cause.
Theists believe a god or gods exist without cause.


2. The universe began to exist; and

This is what we currently think, but for a long time, scientists believed
the universe was eternal and infinite.
It's equally possible the universe is both infinite and eternal.


3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

But god(s) exist without cause, so it breaks the rule.
Saying the rule can only be broken once, via God, is not following the
deductive reasoning.

[hereLiesThisTroper]

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause;

Defining a "cause" is more complex than that, because several factors could
be the cause. Many times, things have several causes.

True there are things that have multiple causes but that still means that they HAD A CAUSE.

We don't know if everything needs a cause.

That is why the Kalam only deals with things that begins to exists. It's not design to explain that everything needs a cause only those that were brought into existence.

Theists believe a god or gods exist without cause.

This is a concrete example of your complaint above. God is NECESSARY and ETERNAL and therefore there was never a moment in time, or outside of time, in which he was brought to existence.

2. The universe began to exist; and

This is what we currently think, but for a long time, scientists believed
the universe was eternal and infinite.

That was because there was no proof back then that the universe was expanding.

Then Hubble came along and discovered that stars and galaxies were moving away from each other which would mean that at some point in the distant past, they were very much closer than they were now and if you move even further into the past, you reach the singularity were time, space and matter began to appear.

It's equally possible the universe is both infinite and eternal.

No it's not. The evidence is leaning to a finite universe. The Big Bang and the BGV theorem shows that.

3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

But god(s) exist without cause, so it breaks the rule.
Saying the rule can only be broken once, via God, is not following the
deductive reasoning.

If the universe began to exists during the Big Bang, then it would mean that the universe is CONTINGENT.

A Contingent object means that it depends on other causal forces or objects for its existence.

For example, you and I are contingent beings. We all need our parents to procreate in order for us to be born on this world. Likewise, our parents are also contingent beings because they need their parents and their parents and their parents etc...

So if we have this very, very long chain of contingent objects/beings, then if we trace it all the way to the beginning, we will soon find out that the first cause could never be a contingent object/being and thus it had to be NECESSARY.

Thus, this First Cause must be uncaused and not of this universe which means it's spaceless, timeless, immaterial and incredibly powerful (because it created the universe).

So again, you said this is not deductive reasoning, actually, if you follow deductive reasoning, you will definitely end up with the First Cause Uncause Prime Mover which theists would call God.

[grosso]

While it is not clear whether Carroll demonstrated that “God did not exist” (although, I think you could argue he demonstrated that there can be a universe where a God does not exist), he did destroy any utility for the Kalam Cosmological Argument (hereafter, “KCA.”)

KCA is a philosophical argument that Craig has championed now for decades.  While there are numerous twists and turns within it involving infinities and other issues, the argument in its basic form can be stated in three tight premises:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause;
2. The universe began to exist; and
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

While Carroll argued I think successfully that no one (especially Craig) knows whether premise two is correct, his real point - and the point that literally puts a steak in the hart of KCA - is that premise one is simply a meaningless statement in modern scientific cosmology.

In his post debate blog on this point he writes the following:

“My attitude toward the above two premises is that (2) is completely uncertain, while the “obvious” one (1) is flat-out false. Or not even false, as I put it, because the notion of a “cause” isn’t part of an appropriate vocabulary to use for discussing fundamental physics. Rather, modern physical models take the form of unbreakable patterns — laws of Nature — that persist without any external causes. The Aristotelian analysis of causes is outdated when it comes to modern fundamental physics; what matters is whether you can find a formal mathematical model that accounts for the data. . .”  (See http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/02/24/post-debate-reflections/, March 23, 2014.)

This is why KCA is dead; it is an anachronism.  It is like making a philosophical argument about why influenza is contagious.  No one is doing that because no one thinks about influenza in those terms.  The KCA as pointed out by Carroll is an Aristotelian argument in a discipline that no longer has need for such arguments.

I am an agnostic (maybe even leaning towards being a deist of some type), and I am honestly open minded about the existence of God.  But it became painfully clear in the Carroll/Craig debate that KCA is of no use to discover such an existence.  Its unfortunate, but it appears that in 50 years Craig’s papers and debates on this issue will be worth nothing more than as an amusing footnote about quaint little philosophers and their crazy ideas from the late 20th and early 21st centuries.

I thought this was an interesting response.Heavy with the polemics, but I'm struggling to see the substance here.

Here are the two critiques I notice, both of which fail:

1) If Carroll said "No one knows whether premise two is correct," he's really misunderstood the Kalam.

The fact is, the argument doesn't expect anyone to "know" any of the premises in the colloquial sense of "know." All it requires, if I remember correctly, is that the premise be more plausible than its negation. If the premises are more plausible than their negation, then the conclusion is plausible to believe.

And I think if Carroll is honest, he has to admit that the totality of the evidence falls in favor of the universe having a beginning. Carroll's criticism, that we don't "know" (in the colloquial sense of know via direct experience, or know with certainty) simply misses the point.

2) The second failure of the critique (not sure if it's Sean Carroll's or yours) is the rejoinder against Aristotelian causation. Can you provide a little more substance to the claim that "Aristotelian analysis of causes is outdated"? Is this a critique about fashion, or something more?

All of the rest, proclaiming the death of the KCA is a whole lot of hype, given the failure of the criticisms I explained above.

[phidiasv]

All it requires, if I remember correctly, is that the premise be more plausible than its negation. If the premises are more plausible than their negation, then the conclusion is plausible to believe.

That's not generally true for deductive arguments. Consider this example:

Suppose I have two standard dice, a red die and a blue die. I roll the two dice outside of your view. And then you reason as follows:

1) The red die landed on a non-composite (1,2,3, or 5) number.
2) The blue die landed on a non-composite number.
3) Therefore, the red die landed on a non-composite number, and the blue die landed on a non-composite number.

That argument is certainly valid. And the two premises are both more plausible than their negations (each of the premises has a 67% chance of being true). But the conclusion is not more probable than its negation. Indeed, the conclusion is most likely false.

[grosso]

All it requires, if I remember correctly, is that the premise be more plausible than its negation. If the premises are more plausible than their negation, then the conclusion is plausible to believe.

That's not generally true for deductive arguments. Consider this example:

Suppose I have two standard dice, a red die and a blue die. I roll the two dice outside of your view. And then you reason as follows:

1) The red die landed on a non-composite (1,2,3, or 5) number.
2) The blue die landed on a non-composite number.
3) Therefore, the red die landed on a non-composite number, and the blue die landed on a non-composite number.

That argument is certainly valid. And the two premises are both more plausible than their negations (each of the premises has a 67% chance of being true). But the conclusion is not more probable than its negation. Indeed, the conclusion is most likely false.

Both P1 and P2 are probabilistic. But P1 and P2 in the Kalam are not.

Do you have a non-probabilistic analogy?

[phidiasv]

Both P1 and P2 are probabilistic. But P1 and P2 in the Kalam are not.

I'm not sure what you mean when you call the premises in my argument "probabilistic". P1 and P2 are either definitely true or definitely false, since I've already rolled the dice. It's true that the plausibilities of the premises and conclusion of my argument are informed by what we know about the probabilities of dice rolls. But that's why I chose it as an example, as those plausibilities should be noncontroversial. I'm not sure why you think there's a relevant difference here between my argument and the Kalam.

Do you have a non-probabilistic analogy?

Since I'm not sure what you mean here, I'm not sure I can provide an example that is "non-probabilistic". Any argument of the form I provided above should suffice to show that the principle you were suggesting is false for deductive arguments.

[grosso]

Both P1 and P2 are probabilistic. But P1 and P2 in the Kalam are not.

I'm not sure what you mean when you call the premises in my argument "probabilistic". P1 and P2 are either definitely true or definitely false, since I've already rolled the dice. It's true that the plausibilities of the premises and conclusion of my argument are informed by what we know about the probabilities of dice rolls. But that's why I chose it as an example, as those plausibilities should be noncontroversial. I'm not sure why you think there's a relevant difference here between my argument and the Kalam.

Do you have a non-probabilistic analogy?

Since I'm not sure what you mean here, I'm not sure I can provide an example that is "non-probabilistic". Any argument of the form I provided above should suffice to show that the principle you were suggesting is false for deductive arguments.

The probability of the truth of P1 and P2, in your example, are indeterministic*. They depend on the roll of the dice. The conclusion thus depends on chance.

The Kalam isn't like that.

[phidiasv]

The probability of the truth of P1 and P2, in your example, are indeterministic*. They depend on the roll of the dice. The conclusion thus depends on chance.

The Kalam isn't like that.

It still isn't clear why you think this is a relevant distinction.

Either way, my argument serves as a counterexample to your principle ("If the premises are more plausible than their negation, then the conclusion is plausible to believe."). So we know your principle isn't true for deductive arguments in general. What I don't understand is which kinds of argument you think the principle applies to, and why.