Objection to Premise #3 of the Ontological Argument

[ssq351]

Ontological Argument

Premise 3: If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

Objection:

Global extreme cannot be logically deducted from local extreme.

For example: For a simple function y = x on interval [1,2], the maximum would be 2, but 2 is definitely not the maximum on the whole range.

[Stephen]

The maximally great being is already being considered in a universal, by definition, and so not a local one.  That is, it is not making the case that what is considered maximally great in possible world X, so should then be maximally great in every other possible world.

[ssq351]

I guess mathematicians provide a better explanation than philosophers.

[Irrational]

Even if we could make sense of what it would mean for an entity to be a maximally great being, such a being could still be able to exist conceptually without existing in any "real" sense.

The whole argument is weak.

[Jonathan G.]

Actually premise 3 is not the controversial premise at all. To the layperson, it might seem confusing at first. But it's a modal fact or even axiom.

[devar93]

Premise 3 is true under S5 modal logic, which the Ontological Argument uses, as well as under any form of Alethic logic (which is the only type of logic to determine these types of metaphysical truths by). So you'd have to get rid of logic to attack premise 3.

[Lion IRC]

SSQ351's objection disappears if you remove the artificial distinction which separates this possible world from that possible world and some other possible world.

Why the need for abstract barriers between 'possible' worlds?

Tear down the imaginary fences between worlds and let the maximal being from each possible world line up side by side so that we can determine once and for all which is the true winner of the maximal being competition.

So long as we have the (very useful) ontology of ordinals and superlatives - good, better, best, tall, taller, tallest, etc. - we can/must infer the necessary existence, somewhere, of The One and Only Greatest, Highest, Most Maximal Being. Even if God died and atheism suddenly became true, the atheist would still have to concede the logical truth that a new maximal being would now acquire the title by default. (Even if that new title-holder was merely a human - the winner of Time Magazine' person of the year, or a Nobel Prize, etc.)

Which is the best rose bush in my garden? The climbing rose? The bush rose? The carpet rose?

By whatever measure I use to determine the maximally 'best' rose in my garden, if there is such a thing as "best" it has to exist. And no matter how big or small my garden, or how many possible gardens I own, the best rose will necessarily be there somewhere - unless there are no (good, better, best) rose alternatives for the flower show judges to choose from.

Building a fence between all my 'possible' gardens doesn't really change the basic ontology which is taking place.