The Free-Will Defense

[TheQuestion]

RobertH wrote: I have read a lot about how ahtheists hate the free will defense. "...and don't give me any of that free-will defense garbage." I have read numerous times, or have read something to the same affect.

Why is it so hated? I think it is logical and rational but cannot understand why an ahtheist would have problems with it. I can understand if they didn't think it was good or valid, but they don't say that. They say 'they don't want to hear anything about it.' Why is that?

It's hated because it's laughably bad.  It limits the capabilites of god, making him not omnipotent, making it not the god of Christianity.  That's not even even touching the obvious issues of limiting capabilities to inflict suffering/to suffer not being equivalent to limiting free will.

Seriously, Platinga's free will defense is a joke.

[Composer]

TheQuestion wrote:  It's hated because it's laughably bad.  It limits the capabilites of god, making him not omnipotent, making it not the god of Christianity.  That's not even even touching the obvious issues of limiting capabilities to inflict suffering/to suffer not being equivalent to limiting free will.

Seriously, Platinga's free will defense is a joke.

Actually christianity is a joke and the Story book itself proves your christian god is NOT all knowing and NOT omnipresent -

As I correctly proved on another Thread - Obviously your god is NOT omnipresent and NOT ' all knowing ' and had to physically ' go down to earth ' to see for itself and find out what it didn't already know. Proofs: -

And the LORD said, Because the cry of Sodom and Gomorrah is great, and because their sin is very grievous; 21 I will go down now, and see whether they have done altogether according to the cry of it, which is come unto me; and if not, I will know. (Gen. 18:20-21, cf. Gen. 11:5,) KJV Story book

And they heard the voice of the LORD God walking in the garden in the cool of the day: and Adam and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the LORD God amongst the trees of the garden. (Gen. 3: KJV Story book (My Bolds)

They were smarter than you suppose being able to hide from your (alleged) omnipresent christian god. LOL!

[TheQuestion]

Composer wrote:
Actually christianity is a joke and the Story book itself proves your christian god is NOT all knowing and NOT omnipresent -

As I correctly proved on another Thread - Obviously your god is NOT omnipresent and NOT ' all knowing ' and had to physically ' go down to earth ' to see for itself and find out what it didn't already know. Proofs: -

And the LORD said, Because the cry of Sodom and Gomorrah is great, and because their sin is very grievous; 21 I will go down now, and see whether they have done altogether according to the cry of it, which is come unto me; and if not, I will know. (Gen. 18:20-21, cf. Gen. 11:5,) KJV Story book

And they heard the voice of the LORD God walking in the garden in the cool of the day: and Adam and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the LORD God amongst the trees of the garden. (Gen. 3: KJV Story book (My Bolds)

They were smarter than you suppose being able to hide from your (alleged) omnipresent christian god. LOL!

Um.  I'm an atheist, dude.  So, I don't know what all this "your god" nonsense is.  

[Composer]

TheQuestion wrote:

Actually christianity is a joke and the Story book itself proves your christian god is NOT all knowing and NOT omnipresent -

As I correctly proved on another Thread - Obviously your god is NOT omnipresent and NOT ' all knowing ' and had to physically ' go down to earth ' to see for itself and find out what it didn't already know. Proofs: -

And the LORD said, Because the cry of Sodom and Gomorrah is great, and because their sin is very grievous; 21 I will go down now, and see whether they have done altogether according to the cry of it, which is come unto me; and if not, I will know. (Gen. 18:20-21, cf. Gen. 11:5,) KJV Story book

And they heard the voice of the LORD God walking in the garden in the cool of the day: and Adam and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the LORD God amongst the trees of the garden. (Gen. 3: KJV Story book (My Bolds)

They were smarter than you suppose being able to hide from your (alleged) omnipresent christian god. LOL!

Um.  I'm an atheist, dude.  So, I don't know what all this "your god" nonsense is.  

I was supporting you and I did make it clear I was referring to those claiming to be christians and I started off by saying - " Actually christianity is a joke and the Story book itself proves your christian god is NOT all knowing and NOT omnipresent - "

The references was purely to them!

[belorg]

TheQuestion wrote:

I have read a lot about how ahtheists hate the free will defense. "...and don't give me any of that free-will defense garbage." I have read numerous times, or have read something to the same affect.

Why is it so hated? I think it is logical and rational but cannot understand why an ahtheist would have problems with it. I can understand if they didn't think it was good or valid, but they don't say that. They say 'they don't want to hear anything about it.' Why is that?

It's hated because it's laughably bad.  It limits the capabilites of god, making him not omnipotent, making it not the god of Christianity.  That's not even even touching the obvious issues of limiting capabilities to inflict suffering/to suffer not being equivalent to limiting free will.

Seriously, Platinga's free will defense is a joke.

Well, I disagree with that. I think there are things wrong with Plantinga's FWD, but it most certainly isn't 'a joke'. It is, in fact, a rather complicated argument and I seriously doubt whether most of the Christians praising it or most of the atheists rejecting it have actually read it. It's much more sophisticated than 'God does not want robots'.

[troyjs]

I don't think belorg and I are going to come to any sort of agreement, but at least I can respect his civility. He doesn't pretend to know more christian theology than he does, or show any misunderstanding of anthropomorphisms in the Bible. The reason why we do not believe that God is not omniscient from reading those passages, is the same reason why we do not believe that God has wings or feathers.

He will cover you with his feathers, and under his wings you will find refuge; his faithfulness will be your shield and rampart. Ps 91:4

[neil meyer]

Honestly, if there is free will (will  without any causal restraint) that does not line itself with the the  Will of God, then there is bound to be 'clashes'.

Their is a word for these clashes it called.

Wait for it

Drum roll please

Sin

Seriously, Platinga's free will defense is a joke.

I'm sure you are much more qualified in Philosophy then Mr. Platinga. Harvard is clearly a place for the intellectually weak. I'm also sure your on the verge of giving us a soul crushing defeat of his arguments. I await your reasoning as to why his arguments are false.

You don't think little of yourself if you think you are going to debunk such a great philosopher's theories, but please inform us why this theory is a "joke"

As to the OP's question to why this thoery is hated it is hated because it debunks one of the old singing tunes of atheists.

Why would a all loving God permit evil in the world? How many times have we not heard this. Atheist almost rejoice in thinking of evil in the world and saying HAH your God did that.

Atheist it does not disprove Theism.

Deal with it

[Thomas Larsen]

belorg wrote: The free will defense works if we assume some very unlikely facts.
Firstly: the FWD a-only works is libertarian free will is possible, which is not even accepted among Christians. Moreover, it is proposed by a proponent of molinism, which already entails an important reduction on what libertarian free will is.
And finally:  the free will defense may work for some generic God who is 3-omni, but it does not work for the God of most varieties of Christianity, because it fails to give a reason why heaven is such a good place although people's free will is violated there.

Plantinga's free-will defence shows the logical problem of evil, which stipulates that the existence of both God and evil are incompatible, to be invalid. If it is even possible that all evils might be caused freely by creatures with libertarian free will, and that a good, all-loving God might permit those creatures to exist, then the logical argument doesn't work.

Of course, the sceptic might respond, "It's unlikely, given the amount of evil in the world, that God exists," but that is a different problem altogether.

So the theist doesn't need to argue for libertarian free will. The sceptic needs to show that libertarian free will is impossible, or that God could have no reasons at all for permitting free creatures to exist in the first place, in order to establish the validity of the logical problem of evil.

[belorg]

tlarsen wrote:

The free will defense works if we assume some very unlikely facts.
Firstly: the FWD only works if libertarian free will is possible, which is not even accepted among Christians. Moreover, it is proposed by a proponent of molinism, which already entails an important reduction on what libertarian free will is.
And finally:  the free will defense may work for some generic God who is 3-omni, but it does not work for the God of most varieties of Christianity, because it fails to give a reason why heaven is such a good place although people's free will is violated there.

Plantinga's free-will defence shows the logical problem of evil, which stipulates that the existence of both God and evil are incompatible, to be invalid. If it is even possible that all evils might be caused freely by creatures with libertarian free will, and that a good, all-loving God might permit those creatures to exist, then the logical argument doesn't work.

That's true.

Of course, the sceptic might respond, "It's unlikely, given the amount of evil in the world, that God exists," but that is a different problem altogether.

Yes, that's the evidenyial PoE.

So the theist doesn't need to argue for libertarian free will.

If the logical problem of evil is attacked ny a molinist like e.g. WL Craig, then he sure needs to argue for LFW, because under (Craig's variety of) molinism, LFW is impossibible.

The sceptic needs to show that libertarian free will is impossible, or that God could have no reasons at all for permitting free creatures to exist in the first place, in order to establish the validity of the logical problem of evil.

In order to really make a case, the theist nneds to show that, although God is omnipotent, there is something He cannot do.
The default position is that God can do anything but the logically impossible. While I agree there might be some mystreious reason for God to be forced into allowing evil, I have never seen any satisfying suggestion. The question always arises: is a God who values the evil choices of people over the lack of evil, to be considered a perfectly good God? Under most definitions of 'good' I do not think He is.

[Thomas Larsen]

belorg wrote:

So the theist doesn't need to argue for libertarian free will.

If the logical problem of evil is attacked ny a molinist like e.g. WL Craig, then he sure needs to argue for LFW, because under (Craig's variety of) molinism, LFW is impossibible.

[belorg]

tlarsen wrote: I actually disagree with you that Molinism is incompatible with libertarian free will. But one doesn't have to affirm Molinism to be a theist, so let's bracket this issue for the time being.

I was taling about WL Craig's variety of Molinism, which he himself demonstrated to be incompatible with libertarian free will in his latest Q&A.
But the point is, the FWD is often used by people who do not belive in one of its main premises. If one does not believe in LFW, or if one holds to a doctrone that is contrary to LFW, then one should not use the FWD.

Well, I don't think the theist even has to give a suggestion for why God might permit creatures who do evil to exist—if it's even possible that God has a reason for permitting evil, then the logical problem of evil is unsuccessful. And you agree with me, I think, that God might have such a reason.

I do not actually think that the God usually described by Christians can have such a reason, but since that is very difficult, if not impossible to prove, I concede that the logical problem of evil is unsuccessful. That does not mean the problem of evil isn't a huge problem for mmost barnds of Christianity, though.

Perhaps all of the possible worlds in which every creature freely chooses to worship God have overwhelming deficiencies: maybe, in every possible world with more than ten free creatures, at least one creature freely chooses to rebel against God

If there is a possible world in which every creature freely chooses to worship God, then it is not the case that if there are more than 10 creatures, one of them will rebel. And there is no reason why a world in which everybody freely chooses to worship God would have overwhelming deficiencies.
And this might work for some generic tri-omni God, it most certainly does not work for the God of most Christian denomonations, because they explicitly hold to a possible world in which everybody chooses to worship God without any deficiencies, namely Heaven.

[Thomas Larsen]

belorg wrote:

Well, I don't think the theist even has to give a suggestion for why God might permit creatures who do evil to exist—if it's even possible that God has a reason for permitting evil, then the logical problem of evil is unsuccessful. And you agree with me, I think, that God might have such a reason.

I do not actually think that the God usually described by Christians can have such a reason, but since that is very difficult, if not impossible to prove, I concede that the logical problem of evil is unsuccessful. That does not mean the problem of evil isn't a huge problem for mmost barnds of Christianity, though.

I respectfully disagree with your final claim. The practical issue of how creatures are to live in a world containing significant evil and suffering is a problem that every human being must face, and Christian theism is entirely compatible with possible explanations for why there is so much evil in the world. As I suggested before, perhaps our universe is part of a multiverse made up of many, or all, of the possible universes that contain more good than evil on balance—it seems quite plausible to me that God might create such an ensemble. And Christianity provides resources for understanding and dealing with evil: the person of Jesus; the doctrine of human rebellion; hope, both present and eschatological; and so on.

belorg wrote:

Perhaps all of the possible worlds in which every creature freely chooses to worship God have overwhelming deficiencies: maybe, in every possible world with more than ten free creatures, at least one creature freely chooses to rebel against God

If there is a possible world in which every creature freely chooses to worship God, then it is not the case that if there are more than 10 creatures, one of them will rebel. And there is no reason why a world in which everybody freely chooses to worship God would have overwhelming deficiencies.
And this might work for some generic tri-omni God, it most certainly does not work for the God of most Christian denomonations, because they explicitly hold to a possible world in which everybody chooses to worship God without any deficiencies, namely Heaven.

Why think there are any possible worlds containing more than ten people in which every creature worships God and does not fall into rebellion? I'm not saying that no such world exists; but possibly no such world exists. To be honest, I don't think either of us have enough counterfactual knowledge to know whether there are any possible worlds with more than X people who do not rebel against God and His purposes, for a large number of X.

Creatures do not "go to heaven" when they die. Or, at least, heaven is not the final destination of creatures on the orthodox Christian view. "Heaven is important, but it's not the end of the world," as N. T. Wright likes to put it. The New Testament generally uses heaven to refer to God's space and earth to refer to the physical realm occupied by His creatures. Accordingly, the Christian eschatological vision is one of new heavens and a new earth, a resurrected universe filled with the presence of God.

Of course, Christians believe that this new universe will be perfect, and that no creatures will rebel in it; but it is quite plausible that God will so overwhelm creatures in this world with His loving, holy presence that they will lose the practical ability—indeed, the freedom—to rebel against Him (see, for instance, Philippians 2.5–11). So I just don't think it's true that the new creation will be a place where people continue to choose to worship God.

Moreover, why do you assume that God's only purpose in creating the world—this universe, or perhaps multiple universes—is to see His creatures worship Him without falling into sin, rebellion, or imperfection? Perhaps a world in which creatures struggle to worship God, and God extends His grace to them, is better than a world in which creatures are created perfect, infallible, and without the real freedom to choose to worship God. I don't know. Both of us are likely to end up in speculation and guesswork if we keep pursuing this topic.

[belorg]

Originally posted by tlarsen

I respectfully disagree with your final claim. The practical issue of how creatures are to live in a world containing significant evil and suffering is a problem that every human being must face, and Christian theism is entirely compatible with possible explanations for why there is so much evil in the world.

Maybe, but (most brands of )Christian theism aren't compatible with the FWD as a 'possible explanation' for why there is so much evil in the world.

As I suggested before, perhaps our universe is part of a multiverse made up of many, or all, of the possible universes that contain more good than evil on balance—it seems quite plausible to me that God might create such an ensemble.

A God who is 'more good than evil on balance' might have created such an ensemble, but the Christian God is not just 'more good than evil', the Christian God is said to be 'prefectly good', and would only create such an ensemble if there is no logically possible way to create something better. But as you yourself say:

Accordingly, the Christian eschatological vision is one of new heavens and a new earth, a resurrected universe filled with the presence of God.

It's obvious that, according to most Christians, creating something better is NOT logically impossible, hence, God should have created this.

Moreover, why do you assume that God's only purpose in creating the world—this universe, or perhaps multiple universes—is to see His creatures worship Him without falling into sin, rebellion, or imperfection? Perhaps a world in which creatures struggle to worship God, and God extends His grace to them, is better than a world in which creatures are created perfect, infallible, and without the real freedom to choose to worship God. I don't know.

I don't know either, but Christians do seem to know what God's purpose is. And the question isn't, "Why can't God have some other purpose?", because, obviously, God can have whatever purpose He wants. The question is,"In what way can we call this purpose of God 'good'?"
And then we arrive at the good old Euthrypho Dilemma.

[Noah Hawryshko]

To answer the original question, the reason and the free-will defense is so inconceivable by itself is that is does not cover natural evils in it's explanatory scope. Take things like a volcano or an earthquake or a tidal wave killing a group of people, for instance. This has nothing to do with any kind of human free will whatsoever, nor could human free will (reasonably) stop it from happening. I personally hold that God is at least the greatest conceivable being, and for this to be true, then it would mean that God would be obligated to commit an evil of some instance if it were necessary for a greater good of some sort (such as greater knowledge of God) to then follow from it. Aside from these bizarre left-field snowball theories about how "x evil can happen and then y evil can happen and then that can lead to z evil and 100 people could become Christians, making it good in the end", I hold that we needn't even go this far, but we rather just have to say that any kind of emotional turmoil, even that which has no outside effect on anybody else, almost always comes with a strong sort of self-reflection, whether it be grief, search for true, or other things that might make a given person come to knowledge of Jesus Christ. This kind of "search for truth" or whatever we may call it, is something so powerful for God's kingdom that the atheist simply cannot say that these kind of evils, even if horrible in their own context, cannot somehow lead to the knowledge of God. I would hold that the burden of proof is on the atheist to justify their premise that evil that may be neccessary to result in knowledge of God could be bad, all things considered. This is, I think, an appropriate alternate theory, which can either be used in conjunction with the free-will defense, or without the free will defense, depending on what your other theological axioms are. Thoughts? and sorry to bump an old thread but I just saw no proper answer at all here for this question.

[Questionaire]

I have read a lot about how ahtheists hate the free will defense. "...and don't give me any of that free-will defense garbage." I have read numerous times, or have read something to the same affect.

Why is it so hated? I think it is logical and rational but cannot understand why an ahtheist would have problems with it. I can understand if they didn't think it was good or valid, but they don't say that. They say 'they don't want to hear anything about it.' Why is that?

They have to say free will doesnt exist, and seek to redefine it in other ways which isnt true, because it is their soloution to  keep not agreeing with theists in arguements like, why does evil exist.