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alex1212

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Predicate Dualism
« on: March 13, 2016, 03:03:17 PM »
Are any of you interested or find predicate dualism sound/plausible? Predicate dualism is the view that while there is only one ontological category of substances and properties of substances (usually physical), the predicates that we use to describe mental events cannot be redescribed in terms of (or reduced to) physical predicates of natural languages.

I find this to be more plausible than eliminative materialism or people who think we will eventually be able to describe these predicates in terms of natural science.
« Last Edit: March 13, 2016, 03:14:45 PM by alex1212 »

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HIJ

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Re: Predicate Dualism
« Reply #1 on: March 14, 2016, 12:51:56 PM »
Is there any position that you don't find more plausible than eliminative materialism?

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alex1212

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Re: Predicate Dualism
« Reply #2 on: March 15, 2016, 09:55:25 AM »
Is there any position that you don't find more plausible than eliminative materialism?

I find most positions to be more plausible. But I think predicate dualism can very much appeal to those who think eliminative materialism is a good option. I do find some other theories of the mind to be implausible as well like occasionalism panpsychism, parallelism, etc.

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aleph naught

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Re: Predicate Dualism
« Reply #3 on: March 15, 2016, 10:03:33 AM »
I'm fine with predicate or property dualism, I go back and forth between naturalism and dualism when it comes to moral ontology (though I lean further to the side of naturalist).

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HIJ

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Re: Predicate Dualism
« Reply #4 on: March 15, 2016, 11:54:10 AM »
Is there any position that you don't find more plausible than eliminative materialism?

I find most positions to be more plausible. But I think predicate dualism can very much appeal to those who think eliminative materialism is a good option. I do find some other theories of the mind to be implausible as well like occasionalism panpsychism, parallelism, etc.

Well, occasionalism and parrellelism aren't really comparable to EM. Those are theories about how the mind "works" (more like explanations of why there is correlation), whereas EM tries to show that there are not e.g. beliefs. Whatever that's worth.